Peckham v. Stewart

Vendor and Purchaser—■ Contract.oe Sale — Dependent Covenants — Failure to Execute Deed — Action by Purchaser — Pleading — Written Offer to Perform — Tender. — Where, by the terms of a contract for the sale of real estate, the vendor agreed to execute a conveyance of the property on or before a specified date, provided the purchasers should, on or before that date, pay the balance of the purchase price, the covenants are mutual and dependent, and the purchasers cannot sue for damages for failure of the vendor to make the conveyauce, unless the complaint alleges a full performance, or offer to perform, on their part; but it is sufficient to aver an offer in writing by the purchasers to pay the residue of the purchase-money, accompanied by a demand for a deed; and it is not incumbent upon the purchasers to allege or prove an actual production or tender of the money to the vendor, in order to enable them to maintain the action, if the vendor did not signify his acceptance of the offer.

Id.—Contract for “Good and Perfect Title.” — To satisfy a contract for the conveyance of a “ good and perfect title,” the title must not only be good in point of fact, but it must also be apparently perfect when exhibited, — that is, free from any reasonable objection. It is not sufficient that it can be shown to be good as the result of an action instituted for the purpose of reforming defects existing in any deed which is necessary to make the chain of title complete.

Id. — Apparent Defect in Title — Misnomer of Grantee. — Where the legal title to land is in a person bearing the name of K. F. Redmond, the execution of a deed of the land by one K. F. Redman does not transfer such a title to the vendee named therein as an intending purchaser from such vendee is bound to accept; and a subsequent execution by the said Redman of another deed to the same land to the same vendee, in which he recites that he derived title thereto under the name of K. F. Redmond, that his name was erroneously written Redmond in the conveyances to himself, and that he is the identical person to whom such conveyances were in fact made under the name of K. F. Redmond, does not, of itself, cure the apparent defect in the vendee’s title.

Id. —-Names not Idem Sonans — Presumption against Identity. —The names “K. F. Redmond.” and “K. F. Redman ” are not idem sonans; but the presumption is, that they refer to different persons.

Id. — Change op Name — Construction op Statute — Misnomer. — The statute of 1873-74, p. 345, which provides that “any person in whom the title to real estate is vested, who shall afterwards, from any cause, have his or her name changed, shall, in any conveyances of real estate so held, set forth the name in-which he or she derives title to said real estate,” was only intended for such cases as that of a married woman conveying land to which she acquired title before her marriage, or where a man whose name has been changed by law conveys property, the title to which was vested in him prior to such change of name; and it cannot be construed as authorizing one who has in fact received a conveyance in which his name has been erroneously stated to correct such mistake by reciting the fact in a subsequent deed.