Marble Lime Co. v. Lordsburg Hotel Co.

McFarland, J. — This is a consolidation of four actions, brought under the mechanic’s lien law, to enforce liens against a building and land owned by the Lordsburg Hotel Company, a corporation. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs, and the hotel company appeals from the judgment and from an order denying a new trial.

There are elaborate briefs on file, — those of appellant covering quite a wide range of subjects. Appellant’s contention, however, is resolved into two main propositions: 1. That the findings are defective; and 2. That the chief finding of fact is not warranted by the evidence. But the real point aimed at is, that plaintiffs’ liens were filed too late.

1. The court below put its findings in the form of separate findings in each of the four cases. Such action was hostilely criticized in Willamette Co. v. College Co., 94 Cal. 229; but in that case there were also separate judgments, while in the case at bar there is only one judgment. It is, no doubt, much better to have only one set of findings. Such a course avoids needless repetitions of facts common to all the cases, prevents possible complications and inconsistencies, and is altogether the clearer and more orderly method. But the question is one mainly of good taste and correct method, and the mere fact that a court adopts the course pursued in the case at bar is not in itself a sufficient cause for reversal.

It is contended that the findings in two of the cases are fatally contradictory, because it is found in one place [334]that “ the building was completed on the second day of August, 1889,” and in another, that it “ was never actually completed.” It is clear, however, that the real facts found were, that although the building was never actually completed, work on it continued until the second day of*July, 1889, on which day work ceased, and the cessation of work thence continued for more than thirty days. These facts constituted a “completion” under section 1187 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and we do not see that any harm was done by putting the finding in both forms, although one, perhaps, would have been sufficient.

Appellant’s counsel contend very strenuously that the court did not find enough of facts.

The pivotal point in the case is, as before stated, whether or not plaintiffs’ liens were filed in time." Upon this point the court found that work continued without a cessation of thirty days until July 2, 1889; that it then ceased for more than thirty days; and that within thirty days thereafter the liens were filed. If these facts were truly found, then the liens were filed in time. But counsel contend that the two findings first named are not findings of fact, but were conclusions (of law, we suppose) based on facts not found. Certain witnesses gave certain testimony; and as we understand counsel, that testimony should be considered as establishing certain facts which should have been found, so that it could be seen whether these facts justified the findings above noticed. But this method of converting testimony into facts might be applied to any case, and would lead inevitably to this result, that the court should find evidence. It would also lead to such complications and refinements on the already much vexed subject of findings as would bewilder justice. It was stated in Willamette Co. v. College Co., 94 Cal. 229, that whether there was a “completion,” and whether there was a “trivial imperfection,” were questions of fact; and it is quite clear that whether there was a continuance of work during a certain period, or “cessation” for thirty days, are also