People v. Urquidas

Belcher, C. — The defendant was convicted of the crime of burglary in the second degree, and sentenced to be imprisoned in the state prison for the term of one year. The appeal is from the judgment and an order denying a new trial.

The charge was, that the defendant entered the barn of one Beale, with intent to commit larceny, and the evidence on the part of the prosecution tended to show that such an entry was made by defendant about two o’clock in the morning. The judgment cannot be reversed, therefore, for want of evidence to justify the verdict.

It is claimed that the court erred in refusing to strike out, on motion of defendant, a portion of the testimony of the witness Rose, and in admitting, over the objection of defendant, another portion of the testimony of the same witness. In answer to this claim, we think it enough .to say that we see no error in the rulings complained of.

In one of the instructions given at the request of the people, the court told the jury: “ If you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant entered the barn of witness Beale, as charged in the information, with the intention of stealing hay therein, then the offense of burglary would be complete, whether the defendant actually stole hay or not, nor would [241]make any difference how defendant effected his entrance into the barn in question.”

It is claimed that the instruction was erroneous, and it is said: “ The jury were not given the legal definition of ‘ burglary ’ in any instruction, unless it be in this one. The words 1 stole ’ and ‘ stealing ’ are not equivalent to the word ‘ larceny,’ and where the court attempts to define the crime, the words, or equivalent words, of the code must be used. The words ‘ stole ’ and ‘ stealing ’ are not equivalent thereto, hence prejudicial error is assumed.”

We see no merit in this point. If the defendant entered the barn “ with the intention of stealing hay therein,” he entered “ with intent to commit grand or petit larceny,” and the jury must have so understood it.

In another instruction given at the request of the people, the jury were told: “ There is nothing in the nature of circumstantial evidence that renders it less reliable than other classes of evidence.”

It is claimed that this instruction was erroneous, for the reason, — 1. That it directs the jury what weight to give to this particular kind of evidence; and 2. That it is not true.