People v. Faulke

Harrison, J. —The appellant was convicted of grand larceny, and has appealed from the judgment and an order denying him a new trial. In the bill of exceptions there is assigned as error certain remarks claimed to have been made by the district attorney in his closing argument to the jury, outside of the evidence in the case, and prejudicial to the defendant, but as the bill of exceptions does not show, other than by these specifications, that the district attorney did, in fact, make such remarks, we cannot consider the inatter. Specifications of error are the act of the attorney, annexed to a bill of exceptions after the trial, and are for the purpose of pointing out the particulars in which errors were com[19]mitted at the trial. The matters to which such specifications point must be found in the substantive portion of the bill of exceptions; otherwise they cannot be considered.

After the testimony had closed, and while the district attorney was making his closing argument to the jury, he made a statement respecting certain evidence, which was disputed by the attorney for the defendant, who thereupon requested the court to direct the stenographer to read the testimony of the witness in that regard. The court denied the request of counsel, stating that the jury had heard the witness, and that it was their province to determine what he testified to, to which ruling and remarks the defendant excepted. After the district attorney had completed his argument, the court said to the jury that they were the exclusive judges of what the witness had testified to, but if any of them were in doubt as to what any witness testified to, if they desired he would have the reporter read the testimony.

There was no error in this action of the court. It would seriously interfere with the orderly conduct of a trial if the court were to interrupt counsel in their address to the jury, by causing the evidence upon any controverted point to be read to them from the reporter’s notes, whenever the opposing counsel should claim that the evidence was not correctly stated. The jury- who heard the testimony must be presumed as able to determine whether it is correctly stated to them by counsel as to weigh the arguments that are based thereon, and unless some one of that body desires to be assured upon the controverted point, there is no occasion for a repetition of the evidence. If the court is itself of the opinion that the evidence is being misrepresented, it will, of its own motion, or upon a suggestion to that effect, cause the proper corrections to be made; but its omission to do so carries with it the presumption that no misrepresentation was made. The subsequent offer of the court to allow the testimony to be read for the purpose of resolving any doubt that there might be ritik