Morgan v. Southern Pac. Co.

California Supreme Court Aug 5, 1892 No. No. 14841Published

Before: McFarland

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Holding. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that conflicting evidence regarding the timing of the train's movement and the extent of the plaintiff's injuries presented questions of fact for the jury, and that the jury instructions and damage award were not reversible errors.

Issues

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of liability against the defendant.
Whether the trial court's jury instructions regarding compensatory damages for pain constituted reversible error.
Whether the jury's damage award was so excessive as to warrant reversal.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It was therefore a question fairly within the province of the jury to decide.”

“we do not see how the language objected to could have influenced the jury to the prejudice of appellant.”

Synopsis

Negligence—Backing of Train at Station — Contributory Negligence— Question for Jury. — In an action for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the engineer of a passenger train in backing the train after stopping at a station, while the plaintiff was alighting from the train, where the evidence is conflicting as to the pe, riod of time between the stop and the movement backwards, the question of contributory negligence of the plaintiff in leaving her seat in the car before the train stopped is fairly within the province of the jury to decide.

Id. —Recompense for Pain — Compensatory Damage — Inaccurate Instruction — Harmless Error.—In such action, an instruction to the jury that “money is an inadequate recompense for pain,” though not an appropriate expression in a charge to the jury upon the question of compensatory damage, does not constitute a reversible error, where the jury are also instructed that resulting pain is an element of damage to be compensated, and that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover, “the measure of her recovery is what is called compensatory damages, — that is, such sum as will compensate her for the injury she has sustained that “the determination of the. amount is committed to the judgment and sound discretion of the jury”; and that it should be “in such measure as a jury, dispassionately considering all the circumstances of the case, will allow.”

Id. — Excessive Damages. — A verdict will not be disturbed because excessive, unless the amount of the damages is obviously so disproportionate to the injury proved as to justify the conclusion that the verdict is not the result of the cool and dispassionate discretion of the jury.

Id.—Earnings of Plaintiff. — The rule that damages recoverable for injuries received because of the negligence of a defendant should not exceed an amount upon which the legal interest would equal the value of the injured party’s past earnings and probable future earnings does not apply to a case where the cause of action is the plaintiff’s own personal injury, but is applied only to cases where suit is brought for the death of a relative.

Id. •—Verdict not Excessive—Conflicting Evidence. — A verdict for fifteen thousand dollars for personal injuries received through the negligence of a railroad company held not excessive under the circumstances of this case, there being evidence tending to show a permanent injury, accompanied with continual suffering and disability, which the jury would be warranted in believing, notwithstanding conflicting evidence as to the extent of the injury.

McFarland, J. This action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant, a railroad company. It is averred in the complaint that while plaintiff was in the act of alighting from the car of defendant, it was, through the negligence of defendant’s servants and employees, suddenly and violently put in motion, whereby plaintiff was, without any fault on her part, thrown upon the ground, and seriously injured. The jury gave a verdict in favor of plaintiff for fifteen thousand dollars, for which amount judgment was rendered; and defendant appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying its motion for a new trial.

1. The point of appellant that the evidence was insufficient to warrant any finding of liability on the part of defendant for the injury complained of cannot be maintained.

The accident happened at the town of Delano. At that place the train usually stops with the locomotive at a water-tank, so that water may be taken for the engine while passengers are going off and on the train. When the train arrived on the evening of the accident, the engineer did not succeed in stopping it until the locomotive had gone about a car’s length beyond the water-tank; and he moved the train back far enough to bring [506]the engine at the proper place to take water. He testified that he did this immediately, so that there was only a moment of time between the first stop and the commencement of the backward movement; and his testimony to this effect was to some extent corroborated. Counsel for appellant contends that this fact being established, it follows that plaintiff must have been guilty of contributory negligence; because, if she had retained her seat in the car until the train first stopped, as she ought to have done, she could not have been on the steps of the platform when the train started back. It is argued that she must have been wrongfully on or near the steps before the car stopped. But witnesses for the plaintiff testified that it was from a half-minute to a minute after the train stopped before it started back; plaintiff testified that she did not leave her seat until the car stopped; and another witness testified that she was not on the platform when the train stopped. There was therefore a substantial conflict of evidence as to the period of time which elapsed between the stop and the beginning of the movement backwards. Counsel say that it was natural, and in accordance with the usual course of things, for the engineer to have immediately reversed his engine and started back when he found himself beyond the water-tank; that there was no reason for his waiting thirty or sixty seconds before doing so; and that therefore the contrary testimony of plaintiff’s witnesses should not be considered as raising a substantial conflict. It could be well argued, and no doubt was so argued to the jury, that the engineer’s version of the affair was more probably correct than that of plaintiff’s witnesses; but after all, the question was one of probability, to be determined by weighing conflicting evidence. It was therefore a question fairly within the province of the jury to decide.

Morgan v. Southern Pac. Co.

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