People v. Devine
Before: Haven, Sharpstein
Synopsis
Criminal Law — Larceny — Felonious Intent — Insufficiency of Evidence. — To constitute the offense of larceny, there must be a felonious intent, and where there is an absence of proof of such intent, and the evidence tends to prove that'the property taken was honestly believed to be •¿he property of the defendant accused of larceny, the fact that he took and carried away the property of another does not justify a verdict of larceny.
Id. — Appropriation of Lost Property Found — Construction of Code — Instruction. — Section 485 of the Penal Code, providing that one who finds lost property under circumstances which give him knowledge or means of inquiry as to the true owner, and who appropriates suih property, without trying to find the owner and restore the property to him, is guilty of larceny, relates in terms to property lost and found, and does not apply to a case where property comes into the possession of a party who does not know or suspect it to be the property of another; and an instruction based on that section, given in such a case, where there is no evidence of the finding of any lost property, is prejudicially erroneous.
Id.—Inapplicable Instruction — Misleading Jury — Prejudicial Error. — Although in some cases an inapplicable instruction which is correct as matter of law can do no harm, yet when it is liable to mislead a jury to the prejudice of one of the parties, it becomes as grave an error as though it were not correct as an abstract proposition of law.
Id. —Prejudicial Conduct of District Attorney—Allusions to Offense not in Issue — Felonious Intent. — Statements, questions, and remarks by the district attorney, in the presence of the jury, in reference to incompetent proposed evidence of previous similar offenses of the defendant, not in issue, for the purpose of leading the jury to believe that the offense charged was committed with felonious intent, the contrary being claimed and testified to on behalf of the defendant, are calculated to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.
Opinion — Sharpstein
Sharpstein, J. “ Larceny is the felonious stealing, [228]taking, carrying, leading, or driving away the personal property of another.” (Pen. Code, sec. 484.) In this case the evidence is sufficient to justify a jury in finding that appellant took and carried away the property of another; but insufficient to justify the finding that appellant feloniously stole the same. Therefore the evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict of guilty of larceny against the defendant, and for that reason he is entitled to a new trial. The evidence shows that the appellant and Robert Doherty occupy adjoining tracts of land, and that each of them keeps upon his own tract a considerable number of hogs. Appellant, wishing to sell some of his hogs, directed two men in his employment to collect his hogs in a pen or inclosure, so that he might select therefrom some denominated “ feeders,” to take and sell to a butcher by the name of Sam Bee, whose place of business was several miles distant from appellant’s farm. Out of forty or fifty-hogs in the corral, appellant, with the assistance of his son and the two men who had driven the hogs into the inclosure, selected eleven “feeders,” which were loaded on a wagon, and conveyed to Sam Bee’s place, and sold to him by appellant. There is evidence tending to prove that three of these eleven “ feeders ” were marked with Doherty’s mark, which differed materially from appellant’s mark, but the difference was not noticed by any save one of several witnesses who had equal opportunities with the appellant of observing the difference in the marks. And the witness who testified to having detected the difference does not state that he mentioned the fact to appellant or any one else. Sam Bee, who purchased the hogs from appellant, testified that he did not observe the difference in the marks until his attention was called to it by William Doherty, about a week after the hogs were sold and delivéred to him, Bee, by appellant. Ro part of the transaction was -.characterized by secrecy, or attempted concealment. Appellant acted throughout as he would be expected to act if he thought he was dealing with his own property, and the evidence tends strongly to prove [229]that he really and honestly so thought. We think that the evidence, coupled with the presumption of innocence, which attends the accused from first to last, sufficient to overcome the presumption of a guilty intent, arising from a wrongful appropriation of the property of another. He was not informed that any of the hogs he carried away and sold were not his own, and all the evidence tends to prove that he honestly believed they were all his own. There is no evidence to the contrary. The rule applicable to such a case is illustrated by Sir Matthew Hale as follows: “If the sheep of A stray from the flock of A into the flock of B, and B drives them along with his flock, or by pure mistake shears him, this is not felony; but if he know it to be another’s, and marks with his mark, this is an evidence of a felony.” (1 Hale P. C. 507.)
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)