Barnes v. Barnes
Before: Haven
Synopsis
Dismissal of Action — Order of Attorney for Plaintiff — Judgment — Jurisdiction — Appearance of Defendant. —The filing, by a plaintiff in an action, of a paper stating that the action is thereby dismissed, simply amounts to an order for the dismissal of the action upon which the clerk is authorized to enter a judgment of dismissal, and does not of itself operate as a dismissal of the action; and the court retains jurisdiction of the action until the judgment of dismissal is entered by the clerk; and if no judgment is entered, and the defendant appears and answers after the order for dismissal is filed, the court has jurisdiction to render judgment in the cause for the plaintiff.
Divorce—Extreme Cruelty — Mental Suffering — Charges of Personal Impurity — Effect upon Health. — A finding that the defendant, in an action for divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty, inflicted grievous mental suffering upon the plaintiff, by imputing to him, in the presence of others, the grossest immorality and personal impurity, is a sufficient finding of extreme cruelty to sustain a judgment for the plaintiff. It is not necessary to allege or find that the charges complained of had an injurious effect upon the health of the plaintiff.
Id. — Definitions of Extreme Cruelty. — Any unjustifiable conduct upon the part of either of the spouses, which so grievously wounds the feelings of the other, or so utterly destroys the peace of mind of the other, as to seriously impair the health, or such as utterly destroys the legitimate ends and objects of matrimony, constitutes extreme cruelty.
Id. —Gauge of Mental Suffering. —It is not necessary that there should be any exact measure or scale by which to gauge purely mental susceptibilities and sufferings.
Id.—Question of Fact — Delicacy of Feeling.—Whether in any case there has been inflicted such grievous mental suffering as will warrant the granting of a divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty, is a pure question of fact, to be deduced from all the circumstances of each particular case, keeping in view the intelligence, apparent refinement, and delicacy of sentiment of the complaining party; and no arbitrary rule of law as to what particular probative facts shall exist in order to justify a finding of the ultimate facts of its existence can be given.
Continuance — Discretion — Good Faith of Application. —Applications for continuance are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless the record affirmatively shows that it abused its discretion. There is no abuse of discretion in refusing to grant a continuance if the circumstances cast suspicion on the good faith of the application, and induce the belief that it was intended only for delay.
Opinion
The Court. Action for divorce upon the ground of extreme cruelty. Judgment was entered in favor of plain!iff, and the defendant appeals.
1. After the filing of the complaint in this action, and before any appearance on the part of defendant, the attorney for plaintiff filed with the clerk of the superior court a paper properly entitled in the cause, and stating, “ The above-entitled action is hereby dismissed,” but no judgment of dismissal was entered. It is claimed by appellant that upon the filing of this paper the court lost jurisdiction of the action, and that jurisdiction was not restored by the subsequent appearance and answer of defendant. This objection to the jurisdiction of the court was made in various forms in the court below, and overruled. The court did not err in its rulings upon this point. The filing of the paper referred to was in effect an order for a dismissal of the action, and would have been sufficient authority for the clerk to h&ve entered a judgment of dismissal, but until the entry of such judgment the court retained jurisdiction of the case. (Page v. Superior Court, 76 Cal. 372; Acock v. Halsey, 90 Cal. 215; Rochat v. Gee, 91 Cal. 355.)
2. It is urged by appellant that the facts alleged in the complaint and found by the court do not entitle plaintiff to the decree, which he obtained, dissolving the marriage which existed between him and appellant. The cruelty alleged and found is, that appellant inflicted grievous mental suffering upon plaintiff, by imputing to [175]him, in the presence of others, the grossest immorality and personal impurity. It is not necessary to state here, with any particularity, the language by which these charges were made. It is sufficient to say that such charges, if false, were well calculated to bring upon a person of ordinary sensibility grievous mental suffering. But it is not alleged in the complaint, nor is it found by the court, that the charges of which plaintiff complains had any injurious effect upon his health, and for this reason it is claimed that the complaint and findings do not support the judgment, under the law as declared by this court in Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251. It was held in that case that a finding to the effect that the defendant had inflicted upon the plaintiff therein grievous mental suffering, but without injury to her health, was not equivalent to a finding of extreme cruelty upon the part of the defendant, and would not sustain a judgment for divorce upon that ground; and in discussing the question as to what constitutes such extreme cruelty as will justify a divorce, the court said: “ Although the character of the ill treatment, whether it operates directly upon the body, or primarily upon the mind alone, and all the attending circumstances, are to be considered for the purpose of estimating the degree of the cruelty, yet the final test of the sufficiency, as a cause of divorce, must be its actual or reasonably apprehended injurious effect upon the body or health of the complaining party.” And it was further said in that case, “ that the practical view of the law is, that a degree of cruelty which cannot be perceived to injure the body y^ihe health of the body * can be practically endured/ ^Jproiísí be endured if there is no other remedy than by divorce; because no scale ’ by which to gauge the purely mental susceptibilities and sufferings has yet been invented or discovered, except such as indicate the degrees thereof by their perceptible effects upon the physical organization of the body.”
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