People v. Hall

Criminal Law—Burglary—Information — Intent to Commit Grand and Petit Larceny—Single Offense. — An information charging a defendant with entering a dwelling-house with intent “ to commit grand and petit larceny, ” sufficiently conforms to the requirements of sections 950, 951, and 952 of the Penal Code, and charges but one offense.

Id. — Intent Need not be Consummated — Double Intent. — The wrongful entry of a house with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or any felony, constitutes burglary, and the offense is complete when the entry is made, whether the intent be afterwards consummated or not. An entry with intent to commit two or more felonies constitutes but one burglary.

Id. — Conjunctive Allegation of Intent — Alternative Proof. — Under an information for burglary, charging an intent to commit grand and petit larceny, the prosecution need only prove that the defendant entered the building with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny.

Id. —Evidence — Declaration of Guilt by Another. — Upon a prosecution for burglary, where it was shown that the defendant and another person were arrested for the offense, and that the other person was mortally wounded while trying to escape, the refusal of the court to allow evidence to be introduced by the defendant to show that the wounded man, when dying, told the physician that be himself was the guilty party, and that the defendant was innocent, is not error, whether the evidence be considered as a dying declaration or as a confession.

Id. —Dying Declarations. —Dying declarations are admissible in evidence only where the death of the deceased is the subject of the trial, and the circumstances of the death are the subject of the declaration.

Id. — Hearsay Evidence. — In a prosecution for crime, the declaration of another person that he committed the crime is not admissible. Proof of such declaration is mere hearsay evidence, and is always excluded, whether the party making it be dead or not.

Id.—Trial — Remarks oe Prosecuting Attorney.—The remarks of a prosecuting attorney to the jury, in a criminal action, challenging the attorney for the defendant to explain the facts and circumstances of the case upon any other hypothesis than that of guilt, and to give his version of the offense, cannot be said to be improper or prejudicial.

Id. — Amendment oe Instruction. — The trial court has the right to amend an imperfect instruction, and its action in making the amendment is not error, if, when given as amended, the instruction states the law correctly.

Id. — Misleading Instruction as to Measure oe Proof — Reasonable Doubt. —Upon the trial of a defendant for burglary, an instruction to the jury, to the effect that the facts that the defendant was found in possession of the property stolen, and was arrested, and while under arrest fled, or attempted to flee, were not sufficient to warrant the finding him guilty, nor even to raise in the minds of the jury a strong presumption of guilt, and that the defendant could not be found guilty, “ except upon the most conclusive proof ” that he committed the crime alleged, is properly refused as misleading and erroneous. The “most conclusive proof” is not required, but only that which satisfies the minds of the jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.