In re Estate of Rogers
Before: Belcher
Synopsis
Will — Construction—Vesting of Legacy.—When a legacy ig given to a person to be paid at a future time, it vegts immediately; hut when it is not given until a certain future time, or when the time is annexed, not to the payment only, but to the gift itself, it does not vest until that time; and if the legatee dies before, it is lost.
Id. —Liberal Construction — Intention of Testator. —Wills are to he liberally construed so as to give effect to the intention of the testator;. and the intention o£ the testator as expressed in the will must prevail, provided it he consistent with the rules of law.
Id. — Conditional Legacy to Grandson — Defeat of Legacy — Distribution under Will. — Where the will of a testator gave to his grandson a sum of money, to be paid only after the death of the testator’s wife, and provided that the income of such sum should be paid him from the time he was fifteen years old until he was twenty-one years, when he was to be paid one half of the bequest, and thereafter the income from the other half until he reached the age of twenty-five, when the balance was to be paid, and that if he should die before arriving at the successive ages above named, then such portion of the bequest as had not theretofore been paid, together with the income thereon, was to be distributed as the other portions of his estate shall be or shall have been distributed, the latter clause of the will clearly shows that it was the intention of the testator not to make an absolute bequest, but a conditional one, to take effect only if the grandson should reach the ages named for its payment; and he having died before the age of fifteen, this legacy did not vest in him, or pass to his mother as his heir, but should be distributed under the will.
Belcher, C. Stephen Rogers died testate on the twenty-first day of March, 1888, leaving surviving him his widow, Caroline Rogers, and his grandson, Stephen Roy Rogers. The will of decedent was admitted to probate, and the widow was appointed and duly qualified as executrix thereof. During the administration of the estate, on May 15, 1889, Stephen Roy died, being then between six and seven years of age. When the estate was ready for distribution, all the residue thereof was, on petition of the executrix, distributed to her and another legatee named in the will. From this order or decree, the present appeal is prosecuted by the mother of Stephen Roy, and the only question presented for decision is as to the construction to be given to the third clause of the will. That clause reads as follows: “ 3. I give and bequeath to my grandson, Stephen, Roy Rogers, son of S. P. Rogers and Ella Rogers, the sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars, to be paid to him as hereinafter directed, and only after the death of my said wife, Caroline, if she survive me. The income1 from the said ten thousand dollars is to be paid to said Stephen Roy Rogers personally for his own private use from the time he be fifteen years old till he be twenty-one years old, and then, when he be twenty-one years old, I direct that he be paid five thousand dollars, being half of the above-named bequest; and that. from the time he be twenty-one till he be twenty-five (25) years old, I direct that the income from the remaining five thousand dollars be paid him annually for his private use, and then when he, the said Stephen Roy Rogers, be twenty-five years old, I direct the remaining five thousand dollars paid to him personally for his own and exclusive and private use. If my said grandson die before arriving at the ages herein named, then the remaining or unpaid amounts of said bequest, together [530]with the income thereon, I direct shall be distributed as the other portion of my estate shall be or shall have been distributed, namely, to the brothers and sisters of myself and wife, Caroline, share and share alike.”
By the fourth clause of the will, the testator gives to his wife, Caroline, if she survives him, all the residue of his estate, both real and personal, and wheresoever situated. And by the fifth clause, he gives, if he survives •his wife, to his said grandson, if he be then living, and to the brothers and sisters of himself and wife, all the •residue of his estate, share and share alike.
It was claimed by the appellant when the order of ¡distribution was made, and is claimed here, that by the will a valid bequest of ten thousand dollars was made to Stephen Roy; that the bequest took effect and vested in the legatee immediately on the death of the testator; and that she (the appellant), as the sole heir of Stephen Roy,—his father having died in October, 1886, — was entitled to receive his distributive share of the estate, to wit, the said sum of ten thousand dollars, to be paid to -her as in the will provided. And it is said by counsel .that the rule is, “ that a bequest, ‘ payable ’ or 1 to be •paid ’ to a person ‘ at ’ or ‘ when ’ he shall attain a certain age, etc., vests the estate immediately, and his interest is transmissible to his representatives.”
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