Moulton v. Harris
Before: Foote
Synopsis
Vendor and Purchaser — Statute of Frauds—Verbal Contract of Sale —Part Performance. — The taking of actual possession of the land by a vendee, with the consent of the vendor, and making valuable improvements thereon on faith of the contract, is a sufficient part performance of a verbal contract for the sale of the land to take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds.
Id. — Exchange of Land — Specific Performance — Evidence — Assailing Title Admitted by Pleadings. —In an action to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land, where the plaintiff alleged that by the terms of the contract she traded her land for a band of horses and a tract of land of the defendant, and the answer of the defendant admitted plaintiff’s ownership of her land, and only raised an issue as to whether the defendant, at the time the contract was entered into, agreed to give his own land as part consideration for the plaintiff’s land, evidence on the part of the defendant tending to show that the land of the plaintiff is not hers in fact or in equity, as against her father’s creditors, is irrelevant and immaterial, and is properly excluded.
Id.—Note Securing Litigated Title — Waiver of Objection—Evidence ■—Payment to Assignee of Joint Payee.—Where a note was given by the defendant for the price of the land which plaintiff claimed the defendant agreed to transfer in part exchange for plaintiff’s land, and plaintiff claimed that the note was given because the title to defendant’s land was in litigation, and was not to be paid if a good title could be made to the property, and plaintiff waived objection to the title and asked for a conveyance of the land, and defendant contended that he never agreed to sell or transfer his land, but that the note represented a part of the purchase price which he was to pay for the plaintiff’s land, the exclusion of evidence offered to show a payment of the note is not prejudicial error, where the proof shows that the note was a joint one in favor of the plaintiff and another person, who assigned it without authority of plaintiff, and the defendant was permitted to testify that he paid to the assignee part of the amount of the note, and it appeared that the plaintiff never knew of or authorized the payment and received no payment whatever.
Id.—Disputed Terms of Verbal Contract — Evidence — Collateral Written Agreement. —Where the terms of an alleged verbal contract for the exchange of land, which has been partly performed, are in dispute, all facts and circumstances which may throw light on the true nature of the contract should be considered by the court, and it is error to exclude from evidence a collateral written agreement between the parties for the assumption of a mortgage on plaintiff’s land, tending to show that the contract is, as claimed by the defendant, for the purchase of plaintiff’s land on the terms testified to by defendant, and not for the exchange or transfer of defendant’s land as part of the consideration, as claimed by plaintiff,
Foote, C. This action was brought to enforce the specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land.
Under the findings, which are, as we think, supported by the evidence, it appears that the plaintiff, the vendee, took possession of the land, by her agents, with the consent of the vendor, and made valuable improvement thereon on the faith of the contract. This is sufficient part performance of the contract, it being oral, to take it out of the operation of the statute of frauds, under the rule announced in Calanchini v. Branstetter, 84 Cal. 258.
The most strenuous contention of the defendant for the reversal of the order refusing a new trial seems to be as to the rulings of the court upon the admission or rejection of proffered evidence.
The contention of the plaintiff is, that she traded her tract of land, about eight hundred acres in Colusa County, for a band of horses and the land of the defendant in Lassen County; that putting her land at $16,000 and the defendant’s horses at $8,000, the defendant agreed to assume a mortgage on her lands over $5,000, and make her a title to his land in Lassen, which was valued at $2,675; that as he could not, on account of certain litigation, give her at that time a perfect title to the land, he agreed to give her a note for the sum last above mentioned, which was not to be paid except in the event the defendant should find it impossible to make title to the Lassen County land to the plaintiff; and she now waives a good title, and asks simply for a conveyance of that land.
The contention of the defendant is, that he never did [422]agree to sell the land in Lassen, but that the note represented a part of the purchase price which he was to pay for the land of plaintiff. As a part of his evidence, he stated that he was to assume the payment of but three thousand dollars of the mortgage debt on the plaintiff’s land, and that he was only to pay interest on that much of it, and that the plaintiff agreed to be responsible for the rest of the sum due by the mortgage, and to pay the interest on it.
The evidence of the defendant was intended to show that he did not agree to sell the land, but that his agreement was to sell his band of horses, then running on that land, and to take the plaintiff’s land at $16,000, to pay $8,000 in horses, $3,000 of the mortgage debt and interest then encumbering the land of plaintiff, and to give his note for $2,675 for the balance of the purchase price of plaintiff’s land.
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