People v. Dixon
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Criminal Law—Grand Larceny — Evidence — Declaration of Co-conspirator. — In a prosecution for grand larceny, where a witness had testified to facts sufficient to go to the jury tending to show a conspiracy between the defendant and other parties jointly charged with him in the commission of the same crime, further evidence of such witness as to a statement made by one of the other parties as a co-conspirator in the absence of the defendant, before the commission of the crime was complete, is admissible against the defendant.
Id. — Striking out Hearsay Evidence — Answer not Responsive. — Upon a prosecution for grand larceny, where a witness who has testified that he saw the horses alleged to have been stolen by the defendant, and upon being asked what he did with them volunteered the statement that he asked a third person whose the-horses were, and that he said they belonged to the defendant, such answer should be stricken out on motion, on the ground that it is incompetent and hearsay. The rule that where no objection is made to an interrogatory a motion to strike out the answer will be denied, does not apply where the answer of the witness sought to be stricken out is not responsive to the question addressed to him.
Id. — Evidence — Persuading Witness to Leave the Country — Acts of Third Parties. —’Upon such prosecution, evidence of a witness tending to show that the defendant persuaded and induced him to leave the country is admissible in so far as it shows the acts and declarations of the defendant, but evidence of acts or declarations of third parties in attempting to influence the witness, not in the presence of the defendant and unauthorized by him, is inadmissible.
Id. — Motive in Leaving Home — Cross-examination. — Where it has been shown, by the examination in chief of a witness for the prosecution, that the defendant induced him to leave the country for the purpose of escaping the effect of his evidence as a witness at the trial, it is proper, upon cross-examination, to ask him if the reason he left at that time was not on account of his father, and it is error not to allow such question to be answered.
Id.—Declarations of Defendant — Efforts of Defendant to Secure Release of Another Party. ■— Where it appeared that, subsequent to the date of the alleged larceny of horses charged in the information, a relative of the defendant and several other persons were arrested for stealing horses in another state, and while in confinement, pending examination and trial, the defendant earnestly exerted himself in various ways in attemping to secure the release of one of them, the statements of the defendant, made to various persons at that time, that he had promised a large sum of money to secure the release of such person, and that he had made arrangements to break into the jail and get him away, were too remote to be admissible in evidence against the defendant, and tended to prejudice the jury against him.
Garoutte, J. Defendant was convicted of the crime of grand larceny, and appeals from the judgment, upon a bill of exceptions. Counsel for appellant relies upon many alleged errors of law committed by the trial court for a reversal of the judgment. The assignments of [257]error, based upon the orders of the court refusing to set aside the information, resetting the case for trial, and denying the application for a continuance, are not well taken. The court committed no error in admitting the evidence of the witness Buckmaster as to the statement of Otis Dixon, made in the absence of the defendant. Otis Dixon was jointly charged with the defendant and one Arthur Sylvester with the crime of grand larceny in stealing the horses described in the information; the witness had already testified to facts tending to show a conspiracy between these parties, and his subsequent testimony pointed in the same direction. The evidence of conspiracy was sufficient to go to the jury, and the commission of the crime not yet being complete, any statement of a co-conspirator was admissible against the defendant. In People v. Geiger, 49 Cal. 649, this court said: “We think there was sufficient evidence of the conspiracy between Alexander and the defendant to justify the court in admitting in evidence the declarations of the former, made previous to the alleged killing. The question of conspiracy was then submitted to the jury, with instruction to disregard the declarations of' Alexander unless the conspiracy was satisfactorily proved. This was the proper practice.” (See also People v. Collins, 64 Cal. 295; People v. Bentley, 75 Cal. 409.)
Otis Goodlow testified that Joshua Buckmaster and Henry Goodlow arrived at the ranch of witness’s father in Oregon. The next morning he (the witness) went out into the field and saw the horses alleged by this information to have been stolen.
“ Q,. What did you do, — you drove them up? A. Yes, sir, and I asked Josh whose horses them was, and he said they were Ellery Dixon’s.”
Counsel for appellant made no objection to the question, but moved to strike out the answer, as incompetent and hearsay, which motion the court denied. This ruling was error. Buckmaster’s statements to the witness could not be admitted in evidence, against the defendant,
Dixon. It has been decided by this court that where no [258]
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