Martin v. Lloyd

California Supreme Court Mar 30, 1892 No. No. 14380Published

Before: McFarland

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Holding. The court held that a general description of land in a deed, which is certain and identifies the property by name, prevails over a subsequent, uncertain particular description. Consequently, the reservation of the 'Dunlap place' in the defendant's deed encompassed the entire tract as historically defined, rather than being limited by the conflicting metes and bounds description.

Issues

Whether a general description of land in a deed prevails over an uncertain particular description.
Whether the defendant had sufficient notice of the boundaries of the 'Dunlap place' despite the recording status of prior contracts.
Whether the trial court's practice of reserving rulings on evidence until the final decision constitutes reversible error.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“the rule is clear, that when a general description is certain, and a particular description uncertain, the former prevails.”

“the language used shows the intent of the parties to except the real Dunlap place, and that the latter part of the description was not intended to and does not limit the boundaries of that place.”

“if two parts of a grant are irreconcilable, the first prevails.”

Synopsis

Quieting Title — Burden of Proof. — In an action to quiet title, the plaintiffs are called upon to show title in themselves.

Deed—Exceptions—Description of Excepted Premises—Name of Excepted Place — Reference to Contract of Sale — Boundary by Road. — Where a deed excepts land contracted to be sold to third parties, and describes the land excepted by name, and also specifies a boundary as extending to the southwest corner of land situated on the east side of a road, “thence N. to Graveyard barranca,” and the contract of sale referred to describes the land by the same name, and bounds it on the east by the road, and by a continuation of the west line thereof northerly to the barranca, the exception must be construed as conforming to the description in the contract, and to the actual boundaries of the place named, and not as describing a due north line, regardless of the road as a boundary.

Id. — Meaning of “North.” — Assuming that the letter “N.,” in the exception of the deed, stands for “north,” such word means “due north” only when that construction is necessary for certainty, or when there is nothing else to show that it was not used in that strict sense.

Id. — Intention of Parties. — The intention of the parties is the main thing to be ascertained; and when the language used is not absolute, it must be construed with reference to the situation of the parties, and the character and condition of the subject-matter of the contract.

Id.—General Description — Certainty—Control of Uncertain Particular Description. — When a general description is certain, and a particular description uncertain, the general description must prevail; and an exception of a place by name shows the intent of the parties to except the actual place named, and not by an uncertain description of boundaries to limit the actual boundaries of the excepted place.

Id.—Reservation Construed Favorably to Grantor—Irreconcilable Parts of Grant. •—■ A reservation in a grant is to be interpreted in favor of the grantor, and the general rule is, that if two parts of a grant are irreconcilable, the first prevails.

Id. — Reference to Unrecorded Contract of Sale — Notice to Grantee. — The exception, made in the deed of land contracted to be sold by name to third parties named in the exception put the grantee upon inquiry as to the location of the boundaries of the excepted place, and is equivalent to actual notice thereof; and it is immaterial that the contract was not recorded until after the purchase was made.

Id.—Notice to Successors in Interest of Grantee.—The successors in interest of the grantee named in the deed containing the exception are in the same position with respect to notice of the boundaries of the excepted place as the original grantee.

McFarland, J. This is an action to quiet title. Judgment went for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal from the judgment, and from an order denying a new trial.

The land in dispute is a narrow wedge-shaped piece, with the point to the south, and widening as it runs northerly. The northerly end of the piece is a certain ravine, called the San Juan or Graveyard barranca.

On the east side of the strip in dispute there is a piece of land called the “ Price tract,” which commences at the lower or southerly end of the land in dispute, and runs along it northerly about one third of the distance up to the barranca. Along the west side of the Price tract there is a road sixteen feet wide which stops at the northerly line of said Price tract.

Now, the contention of plaintiffs is, that the easterly line of the land in contest is the westerly line of said road as far as it extends, and a prolongation of said line northerly to the barranca. The direction of such line would be several degrees east of north. "The defendants contend that the true easterly line of the land in contest commences at the southwest corner of the Price tract on the easterly side of the road, and runs diagonally across the said road due north to the said barranca.

It is true, as appellants contend, that this is not an action to reform a deed; and being an action to quiet title, plaintiffs were called upon to show title in themselves. And the question to be determined was, whether or not the exception in a certain deed to defendant Lewis M. Lloyd included the land in contest.

On November 28, 1884, one Larkin Snodgrass owned a large tract of land —4,280 acres — including the land in contest in this case, and on that day he entered into a written contract to sell a certain part of said large tract to Alice L. Dunlap and Susan A. Watkins. The part of the description of the land mentioned in said contract which it is necessary to here state is as follows: [200]“ Bounded on the east by the road sixteen • feet wide between the lands of Price and the party of the first part, and a continuation of the west line of said road northerly to the barranca known as the Graveyard barranca, thence southerly along the center of said barranca, or corporate limits to the town of San Buenaventura, to the northerly line of the public road, and thence easterly alone said road to the westerly line of said road between the lands of the party of the first part and lands of Price.” Thereupon Mrs. Dunlap entered upon the full possession of the land described in said contract, resided upon and cultivated it, and it became and was commonly known as the “ Dunlap place.” Some time afterwards there was litigation over this contract, which finally terminated in favor of Snodgrass; and on June 5, 1886, Snodgrass and Cooper and Brooks, who then each owned one third of the large tract, entered into a contract with Mary E. Redrup to sell her the said Dunlap place. The description in the contract with Redrup was substantially the same as that in the contract with Dunlap, the part in the description in the contractt with Redrup material here being as follows: “ To the west line of the road running between lands of the parties of the first part and Price, and thence northerly along the west line of said road and the prolongation of said line to the said San Juan barranca.” The land thus agreed to be sold to Redrup was identical with the land formerly agreed to be sold to Dunlap and Watkins, and known as the “ Dunlap place.” On May 13,1889, Snodgrass, Brooks, and Cooper conveyed by deed to Mrs. Redrup the land mentioned in said tract, the description in the deed being the same as that in the contract; and on August 4, 1889, Mrs. Redrup, by deed with the same description, conveyed said land to the plaintiffs in this action. The said contract between Snodgrass and Dunlap and Watkins was recorded June 14, 1887; and the said contract with Mrs. Redrup was recorded November 1, 1887. The deeds above mentioned were recorded immediately after their execution. If, therefore, the

Martin v. Lloyd

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