Bourn v. Hart

De Haven, J. This is an original proceeding, /i wherein the petitioner asks this court to issue a writ of mandamus directed to the defendants, as members of the state board of examiners, commanding them to allow his claim against the state for the sum of ten thousand dollars, in accordance with the provisions of an act of the legislature, the first section of which, and the only one necessary to a proper understanding of this case, is as follows: —

“ Sec. 1. The sum of ten thousand ($10,000) dollars is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the general fund of the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, to pay the claim of A. J. Bourn, a guard at the state prison at San Quentin, in this state, for personal injuries, namely, the loss of his right arm while in the discharge of his duties, under the orders of his superior officer, and while in the service of the state of California.”

The petition sets forth the circumstances under which petitioner lost his arm, but which need not be referred to here, as we have held, in the case of Stevenson v. Caigan, 91 Cal. 649, that the constitutionality of a statute must be determined by the court from what appears on its face, when considered with reference to matters judi- ' cially noticed by the court.

The defendants have demurred to the petition, upon the general ground that the act under which petitioner claims is unconstitutional under sections 31 and 32 of article IV. of the constitution, which in effect provide, among other things, that the legislature shall have no power to make any gift of any public money or thing of value to any individual, or to grant any extra compensation or allowance to any public officer or servant of the state, “ after service has been performed, or a contract has been entered into and performed in whole or in part.”

In the case of Stevenson v. Colgan, 91 Cal. 649, we decided that it was the purpose of these sections of 'the constitution to prohibit the legislature from making direct “ appropriations to individuals from general considerations of charity or gratitude, or because of some supposed moral obligation resting upon the people of the [327]state, and such as a just and generous man, although under no legal liability so to do, might be willing to recognize in his dealings with others ” less fortunate than himself.