Marston v. White
Before: Belcher
Synopsis
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, and from an order denying a new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Belcher, C. This is an appeal from an order refusing to set aside a sale of real property under a decree of foreclosure of mortgages upon t ,e property.
It appears from the bill of exceptions that the property described in the mortgages and decree of foreclosure consisted of two parcels of land, known as lot D and lot I in block G of Horton’s Addition to the city of San Diego. The decree was duly rendered on the twelfth day of October, 1889, and thereafter, on the third day of March, 1890, when the sheriff of San Diego County, after due notice, was about to sell the property under an order of sale issued in pursuance of the decree, the appellant directed the sheriff, both orally and in writing, to sell the lots separately, and as to the order in which they should be sold. The sheriff offered the lots for sale separately as directed, but received no bids for either of them, and he then offered them as a whole, and they were struck off and sold to the respondent, who was the highest bidder and one of the mortgagees. A return to this effect was made on the writ, and a certificate of sale given to the purchaser.
On the 14th of Avgust, 1890, the appellant served upon the respondent her affidavit and notice of motion to set aside the sale, upon the ground that the lots were not sold separately, as required by section 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as directed by her.
When this motion came on to be heard, the appellant introduced in evidence her notice of motion and affidavit in support thereof, a copy of the notice served on the sheriff prior to the sale, the order of sale and the sheriff’s return thereon, and then rested. After argument by counsel for the respective parties, the court denied the motion, and the appellant excepted to the ruling.
Section 694 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that “ when the sale is of real property, consisting of several known lots or parcels, they must be sold separately; or when a portion of such real property is claimed by a third person, and he requires it to be sold sepa[40]rately, such portion must be thus sold. The judgment debtor, if present at the sale, may also direct the order in which property, real or personal, shall be sold, when, such property consists of several known lots or parcels, or of articles which can be sold to advantage separately, and the sheriff must follow such directions.”
It has been held that this section is applicable to sales under a decree of foreclosure, when the decree is silent as to the manner or order in which the separate parcels shall be sold. (Ontario Land & Imp. Co. v. Bedford, 90 Cal. 181.) It does not, however, render a sale of separate parcels en masse, in disregard of its requirements, absolutely void. Such a sale is voidable, and on timely application will ordinarily be set aside. (San Francisco v. Pixley, 21 Cal. 57; Blood v. Light, 38 Cal. 654; 99 Am. Dec. 441; Browne v. Ferrea, 51 Cal. 552; Vigoureux v. Murphy, 54 Cal. 346.)
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)