First Baptist Church v. Branham
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County denying a new trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Garoutte, J. The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner and in the possession of certain church property consisting of real estate, the church building situate thereon, and personal property used therein and belonging thereto, brought this action to restrain the defendants from interfering with said property, and to quiet its title thereto against said defendants, other than the said Branham, sheriff of Santa Clara County.
The defendants deny that the plaintiff is a corporation, and also deny that the plaintiff is seised and possessed of the property.
Judgment in the trial court went for the plaintiff; and this is an appeal from an order denying defendants' motion for a new trial.
The motion of respondent to dismiss the appeal is denied.
Appellant relies upon two propositions to sustain his position: 1. That the plaintiff has no legal existence as a corporation; 2. That it is not seised and possessed of the property involved in this litigation.
As far as the present proceeding is concerned, it is immaterial whether the plaintiff is a corporation de jure, or not. It is at least a corporation de facto, and as such its trustees can maintain suits in its corporate name, until its existence is called in question by a direct proceeding upon information of the attorney-general of the state.
In People v. La Rue, 67 Cal. 530, the court says: “A corporation de facto may legally do and perform every act and thing which the same entity could do or perform-were it a de jure corporation. As to all the world except the paramount authority under which it acts and from which it receives its charter, it occupies the same position as though in all respects valid; and even as against [24]the state, except in direct proceedings to arrest its usurpation of power, it is submitted its acts are to be treated as efficacious.” (Bakersfield, etc. Ass’n v. Chester, 55 Cal. 99; Am. & Eng. Ency, of Law, 197; Taylor on Private Corporations, secs. 145-153.)
It seems the plaintiff,, under sanction of the court, has mortgaged this property for four thousand dollars, which debt is still due and unpaid; unquestionably the plaintiff could be sued in its corporate name to foreclose this mortgage, and it is equally clear that it can maintain this suit in its corporate name to protect the property secured by the mortgage.
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