Watt v. Smith
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Action — Parties — Trustees or Express Trust — Power or Directors or Insane Asylum — Suit against Husband or Insane Person. — Under the statute of 1885 (pp. 32, 33), the directors of an insane asylum are trustees of an express trust with reference to the moneys collected or due for the support of insane persons from persons liable to pay therefor, and have power as such trustees to maintain an action for the recovery from such persons of the amount fixed by the directors to be paid by paying patients.
Temple, C. — This appeal is from the judgment, and on the judgment roll.
The action is to recover from defendant, as husband of an inmate, the amount fixed by the directors to be paid by paying patients.
Judgment was entered for defendant on the ground that plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest, and had not legal capacity to sue; and this is the only question raised here.
All the facts necessary to enable the plaintiffs to recover, if they can sue in their own names, are found by the court. The defendant’s wife was an indigent inmate duly committed to the asylum, and the board had by resolution, in due form, fixed the amount to be paid by paying patients.
The powers of the board are defined by section 2137 of the Political Code, but neither in that nor in any other statute existing at the time this suit was commenced is the board expressly authorized to sue; such authority was given them by act of March, 1889, passed after this suit was commenced.
The duties of the board with reference to such moneys are defined by the Statutes of 1885, pages 32, 33. It is provided, in case an insane person is able to pay actual charges and expenses, a guardian may be appointed whose duty it shall be to pay such expenses to the board; and “if indigent insane persons have kindred of degree of husband or wife, father, mother, or children, living within this state, of sufficient ability, who are otherwise liable, said kindred shall support such indigent insane person to the extent prescribed for paying patients.” And further, “All moneys belonging to the state re[604]ceived by the board of trustees, other than that appropriated by the state, shall be kept by said trustees in a separate fund, to be known as a contingent fund, and the same shall, by the said trustees, be expended at such times and in such manner as to the said board appears for the best interest of said asylum, and for the improvement thereof and of the grounds and buildings therewith connected. A full, strict, and itemized account of all such receipts and expenditures shall be included in the biennial report of said board of trustees.”
It appears from the code that all the expenses of the asylum are paid from the money appropriated by the state; and we have not found any source from which monejs belonging to the state can come into their possession except these funds, received by them in payment for inmates as provided in this act. At all events, these constitute a portion of this contingent fund, which the board is authorized to receive and to expend, and which impliedly it is made their duty to collect.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)