Cody v. Murphey

Garoutte, J. — This is an original proceeding for a writ of mandate against the defendant, county auditor of the county of Mono, to compel him, as such auditor, to issue his warrant on the county treasurer of said county, in favor of the plaintiff who is the sheriff of said county, for the sum of $333.33 as and for his salary as such sheriff for the month of April, 1891.

Under the County Government Act of 1883, Mono County became a county of the thirty-fifth class.

Section 197 of the act of 1883 as amended in 1885 fixed the salaries of the county officers of counties of the thirty-fifth class, and by that section the sheriff’s salary was fixed at four thousand dollars per annum.

By an act of the legislature approved March 14,1891, (Stats. 1891, p. 106), and which was to take effect from April 1, 1891, section 197 of the act of 1885 was amended, readjusting and reducing the salaries of all county officers of counties of the thirty-fifth class, and fixing the compensation of the sheriffs thereof at two thousand dollars per annum.

Plaintiff contends that this act is local and special, and therefore in conflict with article 1, section 11, of the constitution of the state, which requires that all “ laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation,” and also that it is in conflict with article 4, section 25, which prohibits the passage by the legislature of any local or special law “ affecting the fees or salary of any officer.” (Subd. 29.)

If the foregoing act is a general law as contradistinguished from a local or special law, within the meaning of those terms as used in the constitution, then there [524]can be no question as to its being uniform in its operation, for it acts upon all counties and all officers of counties of the thirty-fifth class.

The case of Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal. 142, is not in point. Chief Justice Searls, in drawing a distinction between that case and People v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 444, said: “The distinction attempted to be made by the statute under consideration in that case is not found here. It dealt with forty-eight classes of officers, and was to take effect as to all of them except three classes, upon the expiration of the terms of office of the incumbents. It was a general law, applying alike to all classes, but took effect at different times upon different classes. No such distinction is made by the law under consideration here. The statute we are reviewing operates alike upon all the persons to whom it applies, and it applies equally to all persons in the same category.”