Haight v. Vallet
Before: Sharpstein
Synopsis
Instructions — Material Conflict. — Where instructions on a material point are contradictory, the judgment will be reversed.
Id. — Forged Deed — Effect of Record. —An instruction that a forged deed is void, and conveys no right, title, or interest, “ except if duly recorded it is constructive notice of that fact,” is erroneous as to the latter clause, and is inconsistent with an instruction that “ no legal effect can be produced upon the rights of the parties by recording a forged instrument. ”
Id. — Ejectment — Statute of Limitations.—Where the statute of limitations is pleaded by a defendant in ejectment, who claims under a deed from the plaintiffs’ ancestor which the plaintiff claims to have been forged, conflicting instructions as to the date when the statute commenced to run are grounds for reversal.
Id.—Evidence of Forgery—Subsequent Conduct of Grantor.—In determining whether the plaintiffs’ ancestor executed and acknowledged the deed which was claimed to be forged, the jury had a right to consider the subsequent conduct of the ancestor, and whether he ever, after the date of the deed, claimed the property or its possession, or paid the taxes or street assessments, or asserted ownership over it in any manner. Id. — Handwriting — Expert Testimony. — An instruction to the effect that although the law permits, in certain cases, expert testimony, yet such testimony should be received with great caution, and that the jurors are at liberty to reject it, the same as the testimony of any other witness, if after due consideration they should deem it not well founded in fact, and that they are at liberty to use their own judgment in matters of handwriting, and are not legally compelled to follow the opinion of the experts, is not erroneous.
Sharpstein, J. — This is an action of ejectment, and one of the defenses to the action is, that the plaintiffs’ ancestor conveyed the demanded premises to the grantor of the defendants. Another defense is, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. The verdict and judgment were in favor of the defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal from the judgment and order denying their motion for a new trial.
The exceptions relied on here are to certain instructions given, and the refusal to give certain other instructions requested by defendants to be given.
Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury that “a forged deed conveys no right, title, or interest; it is absolutely void, and as though never made.” The court refused to give it as requested, but in lieu thereof gave the following: “A forged deed conveys no title, right, or interest; it is absolutely void, and as though never made; except if duly recorded it is constructive notice of that fact.”
The latter clause of this instruction is clearly erroneous, and is inconsistent with another part of the charge, [248]in which the jury were instructed that “no legal effect can be produced upon the rights of the parties by recording a forged instrument.”
Another instruction excepted to by plaintiffs reads as follows: “If you find from the evidence that the said Joseph M. Brown, the ancestor of plaintiffs, was not in possession of the property in question, or any part thereof, from and after the eighteenth day of December, 1860, or from any other period prior to the fourth day of March, 1861, to the time of his death, November 2, 1864, and that during that time the defendants or their grantors, or those under whom they claimed, were in the open, notorious, continuous, and exclusive possession of said property, and that defendants and those under whom they claim continued such possession for the period of five years, and during all of said time were claiming to own the same adversely to all other persons, and exclusive of any other right, then your verdict should be for the defendants, notwithstanding that the children of said Brown were minors at the time of his death.” Another instruction which appellants claim to be in conflict with the one last above quoted reads as follows: “ The ancestor of the plaintiffs, that is, Joseph M. Brown, had died on the second day of November, 1864, nearly two years prior to the 20th of August, 1866, so that I instruct you that the statute of limitations, with reference to the land in controversy, did not commence to run against him during his lifetime. And inasmuch as the statute of limitations did not commence to run in his lifetime, and did not commence to run against his children until the twentieth day of August, 1866, and inasmuch as neither of the children had reached the age of majority five years prior to the commencement of this action, I instruct you, as a matter of law, that the defense of the defendants, as against either of the children, and that whatever testimony has been given before you respecting the occupancy or possession of the land
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)