Mayrhofer v. Board of Education of San Diego
Before: Temple
Synopsis
Statutory Construction — Rights of State. — The state is not bound by the general words o£ a statute which would operate to trench upon its sovereign rights, injuriously affect its capacity to perform its functions, or establish a right of action against it.
Id.—Mechanic’s Lien Law—Public Property — School-house.—Under the constitution and laws of this state regulating mechanics’ liens, no public property or public building is subject to a mechanic’s lien, and none can be enforced against a school-house erected by a public school district.
Temple, C. — This action was brought to foreclose a lien for materials furnished to a subcontractor, for the building of a public school-house.
Final judgment was entered upon demurrer to the complaint, and plaintiff appeals from the judgment. Whether the laws of this state give to mechanics and material-men the right to have a lien upon such buildings is the only question necessary to consider upon this appeal.
Section 15, article 20, of the constitution provides: “ Mechanics, material-men, artisans, and laborers of every class shall have a lien upon the property upon which they have bestowed labor or furnished material, for the value of such labor done and material furnished; [112]and the legislature shall provide, by law, for the speedy and efficient enforcement of such liens.”
Section 1188 of the Code of Civil Procedure enacts that mechanics and material-men shall have a lien for labor or material used in the construction of any building or other structure.
The following sections prescribe the procedure and the effect of certain acts.
The claim is made that public buildings are included both in the word “property,” used in the constitution, and in the phrase “any building,” used in the code, and therefore it must necessarily follow that mechanics and material-men are, by these provisions, given a right to a lien upon such buildings.
But this ignores the rule of statutory construction, that the state is not bound by general words in a statute, which would operate to trench upon its sovereign rights, injuriously affect its capacity to perform its functions, or establish a right of action against it.
Says Mr. Justice Story, in United States v. Hoar, 2 Mason, 314: “In general, acts of the legislature are meant to regulate and direct the acts and rights of citizens; and in most cases the reasoning applicable to them applies with very different, and often contrary, force to the government itself. It appears to me, therefore, to be a safe rule, founded in the principles of the common law, that the general words of a statute ought not to include the government, or affect its rights, unless that construction be clear and indisputable upon the text of the act.”
To the same effect are the following cases: United States v. Swearingen, 11 Gill & J. 373; Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 1 Watts, 54; 26 Am. Dec. 33; Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 239; United States v. Davis, 3 McLean, 484; United States v. Williams, 5 McLean, 133; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 6 Pa. St. 136; Josselyn v. Stone, 28 Miss. 753; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345; 15 Am. Dec. 379; and a great many others.
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