Keena v. Board of Supervisors of Placer County

Belcher, C. —The record in this case shows the following facts: In 1872, a certain road in Placer County was laid out and declared to be a public highway by the board of supervisors of the county. In October, 1887, the board made and caused to be entered in its minutes an order that a certain described portion of the said highway “be and the same is hereby abandoned.” In January, 1890, the board made another order, that its order of October, 1887, be set aside and canceled, and that that portion of the road described therein be opened for public travel, and that the road overseer proceed im[12]mediately to remove all obstructions therefrom. The plaintiff then commenced this proceeding in the superior court of Placer County, to obtain a writ of review of the last-named order. The writ was granted and a return thereto made, showing all the proceedings ¿nd orders taken and made by the board of supervisors for the laying out, abandonment, and reopening of the said road.

The court found and decided that the road was properly laid out and became a public highway in 1872, and that it extended across land then and ever since owned by the plaintiff, and which within the last year had been inclosed by him; that on the 7th of October, 1887, a petition in proper form and signed by more than ten persons, all of whom were citizens, residents, and tax-payers within the said road district, and taxable therein for road purposes, was presented to the board of supervisors, asking that the road be abandoned, and thereupon the board made and entered its order declaring that the road be discontinued and abandoned; that on the 11th of January, 1890, the board made and entered an order setting aside and canceling the order of October 7, 1887, and directing that the road so abandoned be opened for public travel as a public highway; that the plaintiff has asked and requested the board to vacate and set aside the order last mentioned, but it refuses to do so; that the plaintiff has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law; that the action of the board in making and entering the order sought to be annulled is an especial injury and damage to plaintiff in this, that unless the order be annulled the board and its road-master will proceed to open and use the road through his lands without giving him adequate or any compensation therefor, and without having acquired the lawful right so to do; and as a conclusion of law, that the order made on the 7th of October was valid, and operated a discontinuance of the road, and the order made on the 11th of January was in ex[13]