Hyde v. Mangan
Before: Garoutte
Synopsis
Ejectment — Defense—Equitable Title. —An equitable title to land, entitling the holder to possession in equ tty, is a sufficient defense to an action of ejectment brought by the holder of the legal title.
Id. — Mortgage by Deed Absolute — Title of Defendant — Pleading — Denial of Ownership.— Evidence. —The defendant in an action of ejectment may show, under the denial of the plaintiff’s ownership, that the apparent title of the plaintiff consists only of a mortgage by deed absolute in form, given as security for an indebtedness, and that the title is in the defendant.
Id. — Vendor and Purchaser — Contract of Sale — Assignment as Security—Title Obtained by Subsequent Assignee.—The obtaining of title from a vendor by a subsequent assignee of an equitable interest arising under a contract of sale, which was originally assigned by the purchaser as security for indebtedness, will not entitle such assignee to recover in ejectment against the purchaser in possession, against whom the vendor would not be entitled to recover.
Id. —• Mortgage Debt Barred by Limitation. — The fact that the mortgage debt is barred by the statute of limitations is immaterial, and cannot affect the defense of the purchaser in possession under the contract of sale to an action of ejectment by the assignee of the mortgage security, who has obtained title from the vendor.
Bona Fide Purchasers — Assignment of Equitable Interest.—The assignee of an equitable interest in land is not protected by the rule as to bona fide purchasers.
Id.—Notice of Equity—Possession of Claimant. — The fact of open, notorious, and exclusive possession of land by an occupant in possession under a contract of purchase at the time of purchase and securing of a conveyance by another vendee from the vendor out of possession, is sufficient to put the latter vendee upon inquiry as to the rights or claims of the occupant, and a failure so to inquire does not any more entitle him to be regarded as a purchaser in good faith than if he had so inquired and ascertained the real claim of the occupant.
Id.—Notice of Character of Assignment. — A subsequent assignee of a mortgage security is deemed to have notice of the character of the original assignment.
Assignment of Mortgage Security — Transfer of Debt. — The assignment of a mortgage security without a transfer of the indebtedness confers no right. The debt and security are inseparable, and the mortgage alone is not a subject of transfer.
Garoutte, J. This is an action of ejectment, the complaint being in the usual form. The answer makes a general denial, and then alleges certain facts in the nature of a special defense. Judgment went for the defendants in the lower court, and the case is before us [323]for consideration upon an appeal from the judgment, and from the order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
The following are substantially the findings of the court, and they are supported both by the allegations of defendants’ special defense and by the evidence: That upon the twentieth day of October, 1879, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company was the owner of a certain tract of land situated in Tulare and Fresno counties, and at said time Mary A. Mangan, who was the wife of J. M. Mangan, entered into a written contract with said company, whereby said company contracted to sell to her said real property for an agreed price; and said Mary A. Mangan at that time from her separate property paid a portion of said purchase price, and agreed to pay the balance on or before the twentieth day of October, 1884, with interest at ten per cent per annum; and upon the payment of said purchase price and interest, said company agreed to execute and deliver to her a deed in fee of said premises; that upon the execution of said agreement, the defendants entered into the possession of said property, and ever since said time have been in. the open, notorious, and exclusive possession and occupancy thereof, having valuable improvements thereon, and claiming to own the same; and the plaintiff, prior (o his purchase, never made any inquiry from them, or either of them, as to their rights or claims in and to the premises; that about the eighteenth day of September, 1883, defendant Mary A. Mangan assigned her interest in and to the foregoing contract of sale to one Brownstone, to secure a promissory note given by defendant J. M. Mangan to said Brownstone; and said assignment was made with the understanding that said contract should be reassigned to her when said note and interest were paid; that said note was subsequently surrenderd to J. M. Mangan, and he gave a new note to Brownstone for a larger amount (including the amount of the first note) [324]without the consent or knowledge of Mary A. Mangan, and no part of'said note has been paid; that upon the twenty-second day of November, 1883, Brownstone assigned an undivided one-half interest in said contract to B. Schwartz, and upon February 25, 1888, Brownstone and Schwartz assigned said contract to one Erlanger, who had actual knowledge of the claims and rights of defendants in and to said land; that upon the seventh day of March, 1888, Erlanger assigned said contract to plaintiff, who, upon the fourteenth day of March, 1888, made full payment to said railroad company for said land, surrendered said contract, and received a deed therefor.
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