Latham v. City of Los Angeles

De Haven, J. This is an action by the plaintiff, Latham, against the defendants, the City of Los Angeles and one L. M. Bigelow, to quiet title to certain tracts of land in the city of Los Angeles, but by stipulation between the plaintiff and the said city — filed in the court below — the only portion of the property described in the complaint now in litigation is the lot known as the engine-house lot.

There was also a stipulation entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant Bigelow, by which it was agreed, in. addition to other matters, that the plaintiff and said Bigelow were u equally interested, and held in equal and undivided parts the lot known as the engine-house lot.”

The judgment of the court below was to the effect that the plaintiff and said defendant Bigelow are the owners in equal shares of said engine-house lot, and that the city of Los Angeles has no right in or title to the same.

The defendant city moved for a new trial, which was denied, and from the judgment, and the order denying its motion for a new trial, appeals. The appeal is from the whole judgment, and the defendant Bigelow has not been served with notice of appeal.

The findings support the judgment.

The plaintiff deraigns title through a grant or order made by the ayuntamiento of the pueblo of Los Angeles to one Leandry, and the possession given him by the alcalde in pursuance of such order.

That the pueblo had authority to make the grant of the land in question to said Leandry, if it was a house lot, is not questioned, but it is claimed—as we under[518]stand the contention of appellant — that the grant is void for uncertainty, and for the further reason that, prior to the alleged grant, which was in 1836, the land ■ in question had become a public plaza, or street, and for that reason could not be granted for private purposes.

We think, however, that the petition and the orders made by the authorities of the pueblo thereon, and the report of the alcalde describing the land, of which he had given Leandry possession by order of the ayuntamiento, when read together, as they must be, are sufficiently definite, and that the calls therein embrace the land in controversy was shown upon the trial by uncontradicted extrinsic evidence. Nor is the evidence sufficient to show that at the date of this.grant the lot in. controversy was a public plaza, and therefore beyond the authority of the pueblo to grant. It does appear that it was vacant, and that it was-used by owners of adjacent lots in going to and from such lots; but it is not shown that such lots were granted,, with reference to this lot,, as a plaza, or that it ever had been in any manner set-apart or recognized by the .-authorities as a plaza. It is also shown that upon certain days the public would use it as a place for celebrating and for other public amusements. But all of this only shows that, being vacant, and unoccupied, it was used as any other vacant land might have been, and is not sufficient to overthrow the presumption that the authorities of the pueblo of Los Angeles acted within the limits of official authority in making to Leandry the grant or concession in question.^ That such presumption attaches to the grant we are considering 'is the effect of the decisions of this court in Cohas v. Raisin, 3 Cal. 453; Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220.