Kellogg v. Cochran
Before: Vanclief
Synopsis
Insane Persons — Restoration to Capacity — Construction of Code.— The provisions of section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizing the court to restore a person adjudged insane or incompetent is only applicable to those for whom guardians have been appointed under section 1764 of the same code, and does not apply to persons committed to insane asylums under the regulations of the PoKtical Code.
Id.—Discharge from Insane Asylum — Jurisdiction of Court — Habeas Corpus. —No court in this state is authorized to discharge a person who has been committed to an insane asylum, or to restore him to capacity, under any circumstances, except upon writ of habeas corpus.
Id. — Power of Officers of Asylum. —• The power to discharge an inmate of an insane asylum otherwise than upon habeas corpus is vested exclusively in the officers of the asylum, and includes the power to determine whether the patient has recovered, and the authority to discharge persons who have sufficiently recovered, and also persons who have been improperly committed.
Id.—Effect of Discharge from Asylum — Restoration to Capacity— Right to Sue. — The effect of a discharge by the officers of an asylum of an insane inmate, if no guardian has been appointed under the act of «March 9, 1885, is, to restore the person discharged to legal capacity to sue.
Id. —Malicious Prosecution — Commitment of Sane Person to Asylum. — An action for damages will lie for a malicious prosecution on a charge of insanity, resulting in an order of commitment to an insane asylum of a person who was not insane.
Id. — Order of Commitment — Evidence — Probable Cause. — In such action, the order of commitment is not conclusive evidence against the plaintiff of his insanity at any time, or of probable cause for the prosecution.
Rehearing-—■ Practice.—A rehearing in the supreme court will not be granted in order to consider points not made in the argument upon which the case was originally submitted.
Vanclief, C. The purpose of this action is to recover from the defendants damages for a malicious prosecution of the plaintiff as an insane person, and causing him to be unlawfully arrested and committed to the insane asylum at Stockton. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained by the court. The plaintiff declined to amend his complaint, and final judgment was thereupon rendered against him, dismissing his complaint, and for costs, from which he appeals on the judgment roll.
The grounds of demurrer are, that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and “that it appears, upon the face of the complaint, that the plaintiff has not the legal capacity to sue herein.”
The substance of those parts of the complaint relevant to these grounds of demurrer is as follows: That on January 28, 1889, the defendants willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and without probable cause, “caused and procured the plaintiff to be arrested and committed to the state insane asylum at Stockton, state of California, on the charge of insanity; that under and by virtue of said commitment plaintiff -was unlawfully and against his will detained and imprisoned in said state insane [195]asylum, at Stockton, on said charge of insanity, for and during the period from said twenty-eighth day of January, 1889, up to and including the twentieth day of February, 1889, whereupon said plaintiff was then and there given leave of absence, and afterwards, to wit, April 13, 1889, was discharged; that plaintiff was not on said 28th of January, 1889, or ever,-at any other time before or since said day, dangerously insane, or insane at all, nor was he at any of said times so far disordered in his mind as to injure health, person, or property, all of which was known by said defendants before and at the time of said arrest and commitment.”
The learned counsel for respondents contend that the demurrer was properly sustained on the ground that the plaintiff had not legal capacity to sue, for the reasons: 1. That it appears, on the .face of the complaint, that the plaintiff had been adjudged to be insane on January 28, 1889, by the judge of a court of record pursuant to section 2217 of the Political Code, relating to commitments to the state insane asylums; and 2. That such adjudication is conclusive upon the plain tiff, not only that he was insane at the time he was so adjudged, but that he continued to be insane at the time this action was commenced, unless before that time he had been found to be of sound mind, and capable of taking care of himself and property, as authorized by section 1766 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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