Ex parte Williams
Before: Fox
Synopsis
Constitutional Law—House oe Correction in San Francisco—Local Legislation—Punishment oe Crime. —The act of 1878 providing for the sentencing of certain prisoners convicted of felonies or misdemeanors in the city and county of San Francisco to the house of correction in said city and county, in the discretion of the court, is not special or local, either for the punishment of crimes or misdemeanors, or for regulating the practice of the courts of justice, and is not in conflict with section 25, article 4, of the constitution.
Id. —Jurisdiction oe Superior Court oe San Francisco. —The superior court of the city and county of San Francisco is the constitutional successor of the municipal criminal court of the city and county of San Francisco, as respects all cases of felony formerly committed to the jurisdiction of that court, and it is its r. evince and right, as the successor of the municipal criminal court, to sentence to the house of correction persons convicted of felony in said city and county who are of the same class as might have been placed therein by the municipal criminal court under the act to establish the house of correction.
Id. — Construction oe Statute. — The power of the superior court to sentence a defendant convicted of felony in the city and county of San Francisco to the house of correction therein, under the terms of the act of 1878, is not affected by the act of 1885 “to provide for the commitment of persons convicted of crime to the house of correction,” which relates only to minor offenses, punishable by imprisonment in the county jail, without regard to age.
Id.—Age oe Prisoner Convicted oe Felony — Presumption — Habeas Corpus. —Where the record is silent as to the age of a prisoner committed to the house of correction upon conviction of a felony, the court must be presumed to have discharged its duty in ascertaining the fact that the prisoner was under twenty-five years of age at the date of judgment; and whether the finding be evidenced by the record or by the pre-sumption o£ law, its correctness can only be reviewed upon appeal under a bill of exceptions, and cannot be inquired into upon habeas corpus.
The Court. In this case, by leave of the court, an amended petition was filed after the decision which was filed July 24, 1890, and on such amended petition the petitioner was permitted to reargue the case on the question of the constitutionality of the act of 1878, under which petitioner was sentenced to the house of correction.
After a patient hearing and investigation, we deem it necessary only to add to that which was said in our former opinion, that in our judgment the act is not in conflict with section 25, article 4, of the constitution. It -is not special or local, either for the punishment of crimes or misdemeanors, or regulating the practice of courts of justice. The laws for the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors are uniform throughout" the state, in the matter of determining what is a felony and what a misdemeanor, and the legal consequences flowing from the conviction of either. They are uniform in prescribing the punishment of imprisonment (when such punishment is allowed at all) for each of the several offenses for which that punishment is provided. This act does not change the punishment or the degree of the crime. All that it does is to authorize the court in San Francisco, in its discretion, to cause the punishment to be inflicted in one place, instead of either of two or three others where it might be done. If the legislature has no power to authorize courts to do this, then it is powerless to provide for imprisonment for felony in more than one place in the state. We find no such limitation upon the [80]power of the legislature in the premises. If, as is claimed in argument, the imprisonment must be in a state prison, in order to be equal and uniform, then there must be but one state prison; for if more than one, even though the government and discipline in all be the same, it would be impossible that the climatic and other conditions would be the same, and hence the conditions of punishment would be unlike. Such cannot be the meaning of the constitution or the law. It is the fact of imprisonment, and the labor during confinement, and the civil consequences that attach to the conviction, that constitute the punishment, and not the place where the imprisonment is carried out.
ISTor is the act one regulating the practice in courts of justice. Practice is that course of proceeding by which the investigation is had and the judgment reached. When reached, the place and manner of executing the judgment (it being uniform in character with other judgments in like cases) is subject to legislative discretion; and the legislature may prescribe that all judgments, upon conviction for felony, shall be executed in one place, or that those in different parts of the state may be executed in different places, or having prescribed different places for such purposes, it may, as it has, leave it to the discretion of the court in each instance to determine in which of them the judgment shall be executed.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)