People v. Ah Gee Yung
Before: Foote, McFarland
Synopsis
Criminal Law — Homicide — Evidence — Burden of Proof — Mitigating Circumstances — Reasonable Doubt. — Under section 1105 of the Penal Code, casting upon the defendant charged with the commission of a homicide the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the homicide, after the prosecution has shown the commission of the act charged, the defendant is only bound to produce such evidence as will create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense charged, and he need not prove such circumstances by a preponderance of evidence; but it is incumbent upon the defendant to produce evidence sufficient to raise such reasonable doubt.
Id,—Presumption of Criminal Intent — Rebutting Evidence.—An unlawful act is presumed to have been committed with unlawful intent, but the presumption may be rebutted, and is sufficiently rebutted and overcome when a reasonable doubt is raised as to the defendant’s guilt, and if a reasonable doubt is raised, the burden or onus is lifted, and the jury must presume an absence of such criminal intent.
Id.—Instruction as to Burden of Proof — Language of Statute.— An instruction as to the burden of proof in a case of homicide, substantially in the language of section 1105 of the Penal Code, cannot be misleading or prejudicial, if the court in its charge emphasizes and clearly enforces the right of the defendant to have in every step of the case all reasonable doubts as to his guilt, or as to any fact essential to show guilt, resolved in his favor.
Id.—Instruction as to Degrees of Offense — Assumption of Guilt — Construction of Charge. — An instruction as to the degrees of the offense of homicide, and stating that should the jury entertain a reasonable doubt as to which of the grades of crime named the defendant may be guilty of, if any, they will give the benefit of such doubt and acquit him of the higher offense, and can find him guilty of the lower offense only, is not prejudicially erroneous, as assuming that they cannot find him not guilty, where it appears from the general tenor of the charge, and from the instruction as to the form of verdict, that the jury were expressly told that they could bring in a verdict of acquittal.
Opinion — Foote
Foote, C. — The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree. From the judgment rendered against him, and an order denying a new trial, this appeal is prosecuted. It is argued, on behalf of the defendant, that the court, among others, gave an erroneous instruction to the jury, reading thus: “ In every crime or public offense, gentlemen of the jury, there must exist a union or joint operation of act and intent or criminal negligence. But when the act committed by the accused is of itself an unlawful act, the law, in the first instance, presumes the criminal intent, and the onus or burden of proof falls upon the defendant to show the absence of [146]criminal intent. In this case, if you find from the evidence that the defendant struck the fatal blow, then the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the homicide, devolves upon the defendant, unless the proof upon the part of the prosecution tends to show that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justifiable or excusable.” Following this it is stated: “The law presumes every man to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond any reasonable doubt, and this presumption attaches at every stage of the case, and to every fact essential to'a conviction.” And throughout the instructions asked by the defendant, and given by the court, the principle is enunciated that at all times, and under all circumstances, it is incumbent upon the people to establish the guilt of the defendant by evidence beyond any reasonable doubt.
Nowhere, either in the charge or in the instructions, is it even hinted that the lifting the burden, by showing the absence of criminal intent thrown upon the defendant by the proof that he struck the fatal blow, must be done by any preponderance of proof. The instruction in this respect, substantially, is in the language of section 1105 of the Penal Code, and the meaning to be attached thereto is expressly stated in People v. Bushton, 80 Cal. 160, as follows: “ The section [Pen. Code, 1105] casts upon the defendant the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse the commission of the homicide. This does not mean that he must prove such circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, but that the presumption that the killing was felonious arises from the mere proof by the prosecution of the homicide, and the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, etc., is thereby cast upon him. He is only bound under this rule to produce such evidence as will create, in the minds of the jury, a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense charged.” When such reasonable
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