People v. Sansome
Before: Belcher, McFarland
Synopsis
Criminal Law — Prior Conviction—Beading Confession to Jury.— Where an indictment or information for felony charges a prior conviction, which the defendant has confessed, it is clearly erroneous to require the whole indictment, including the charge and confession of prior conviction, to be read to the jury.
Id.—Waiver of Error — Proof of Pardon.—Such error is not waived by proof on the part of the defendant that he was pardoned for the offense, the prior conviction of which had been charged against him in the indictment.
Id. — Curing Error—Instruction.—Nor is such error cured by an instruction to the jury that they have nothing to do with the prior conviction, but only to determine whether the offense charged was committed by the defendant.
Id.—Bobbery—Evidence of Possession of Burglars’ Tools.—Upon the trial of a defendant accused of stage robbery, committed in Placer County, and charged with a prior cohviction of burglary, it is not competent to introduce evidence that burglars’ tools were found in his possession, forty-one days after the robbery, in Sacramento, it not appearing that the robbery was committed by aid of such tools, and the evidence being conflicting and wholly circumstantial as to defendant’s connection with the robbery.
Id.—Circumstantial Evidence—Instruction as to Probabilities.— It is erroneous to instruct the jury in a criminal case, where the evidence is circumstantial, that “when direct evidence cannot be produced, minds will act on the probabilities of the case, and that they should be governed by the superior number of probabilities on the side of the people or the defendant.” (Per McFarland, J.)
Id. — Instruction as to Degree of Certainty. — An instruction that, “in order to convict, the circumstantial evidence should be such as to produce nearly the same degree of certainty as that which arises from direct testimony,” commented on and criticised. (Per McFarland, J.)
Opinion — Belcher
Belcher, C. C. The defendant was convicted of the crime of robbery, and sentenced to imprisonment in the state prison for life. He appeals from the judgment, and an order denying him a new trial.
The indictment under which defendant was tried charged him with the crime of robbery, and also with a prior conviction of the crime of burglary. On being arraigned, he pleaded not guilty to the charge of robbery, and confessed the prior conviction of burglary.
When the case came on for trial, a jury was impaneled and sworn, and thereupon the court directed the clerk to read to the jury the indictment and state defendant’s pleas thereto. The defendant objected to the reading of that part of the indictment which charged a prior conviction, and to the statement of his plea thereto. The court overruled the objection, and the defendant reserved an exception. The clerk then, by the direction of the court, read to the jury the whole indictment, and stated “that to the said charge of prior conviction that the defendant confessed the same, and he was guilty.”
This ruling is complained of by the appellant, and we think it clearly erroneous. The code provides: “ If the indictment or information be for felony, the clerk must read it, and state the plea of the defendant to the jury, and in cases where it charges a previous conviction, and the defendant has confessed the same, the clerk, in reading it, shall omit therefrom all that relates to such previous conviction.” (Pen. Code, sec. 1093, subd. 1; and see People v. Meyer, 73 Cal. 548.)
It is, however, contended for respondent that the error was rendered harmless by the subsequent proceedings. The facts relied upon are these: In the progress of the
trial, counsel for defendant asked one of his witnesses if he had assisted the defendant in procuring a pardon from the state prison, and the witness answered that he had. He was then asked if he had the pardon, and answered that defendant left it with him, and that he had [451]it in court. On cross-examination, the witness was asked where the pardon was, “and he took it out of his pocket, and it was offered and admitted in evidence, without any objection by defendant or his counsel. The pardon was then read without objection, and proved to be the pardon of the defendant for the very offense the prior conviction of which had been charged against him in the indictment.” And the court, of its own motion, instructed the jury as follows: “The defendant is charged with the offense of robbery, and also with a prior conviction of burglary. Now, you have nothing to do with the prior conviction of burglary. All you have to do is, — 1. To determine whether the alleged robbery was committed; and 2. If it was, whether the defendant committed it. Of course, if no robbery was committed, you will acquit the defendant.”
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