Knott v. Peden

Gibson, C. Plaintiff brought this action against appellant, Peden, and two others to quiet his title to a certain tract of land in Tehama County. A joint answer was filed, in which the co-defendants of Peden disclaimed any interest in the land, and the latter admitted that, prior to the sixteenth day of March, 1885, the title thereto was in plaintiff, but averred that such title was, on that date, transferred to his grantor, one Gale, by virtue of a sale of the land for delinquent taxes, upon which Gale, in due course, received a certificate of sale of and a tax deed to the premises. The trial court, with other facts, found the assessment, upon which the sale and deed rested, to be void, and gave judgment for plaintiff- This appeal is from that judgment, and an order denying a new trial.

Insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings is the only reason presented for a reversal of the judgment.

In the statement twelve findings are specified as being unsupported by the evidence, but none of the specifications, as required by subdivision 3 of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure, show wherein the evidence is insufficient, except the first, in which it is stated that there is no evidence to support the finding assailed; for if there is no evidence to support a finding, such a specification would, of course, be sufficient. And as it has [301]been repeatedly held that such requirement cannot be dispensed with, we could properly confine our examination to this one finding. But as respondent's counsel have not objected upon this ground, and have treated the specifications as sufficient, we have examined the evidence and find that it is sufficient to support the findings. The main fact disclosed by it, and upon which the case turns, is, that the assessment made by the county assessor of Tehama County for the year 1884 is invalid.

The assessment roll for that year^shows that, in addition to the property in controversy, which is valued at $2,340, two town-lots and the improvements thereon, valued at $325, and certain personal property of the value of $70, were assessed to the plaintiff. The town-lots were subject to a mortgage interest of the value of three hundred dollars, in favor of one Potts, and the land in question to a mortgage interest of the value of two thousand dollars, in favor of one Dowling.

The assessment and taxation of property subject to a mortgage, and the mortgage itself, are governed by the following rule, established by the constitution of the state: “A mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or other obligation by which a debt is secured, shall, for the purposes of assessment and taxation, be deemed and treated as an interest in the property affected thereby. Except as to railroad and other quasi public corporations, in case of debts so secured, the value of the property affected by such mortgage, deed of trust, contract, or obligation, less the value of such security, shall be assessed and taxed to the owner of the property, and the value of such security shall be assessed and taxed to the owner thereof, in the county, city, or district in which the property affected thereby is situate.” (Art. 13, sec. 4.)