People v. Bushton

California Supreme Court Aug 5, 1889 No. No. 20517Published

Before: Thornton, Works

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Holding. The court held that an instruction requiring a defendant to prove circumstances of mitigation or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence is erroneous, as the defendant is only required to produce evidence sufficient to create a reasonable doubt of guilt.

Issues

Whether the trial court erred in allowing the use of prior inconsistent testimony for impeachment purposes.
Whether an instruction requiring a defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence violates the rule of reasonable doubt.
Whether instructions regarding the presumption of intent and the defense of accident were erroneous.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The tenth instruction was erroneous.”

“He is only bound under this rule to produce such evidence as will create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense charged.”

“The well-settled rule that a defendant shall not be convicted unless the evidence proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies to the whole and every material part of the case”

Synopsis

Criminal Law—Homicide—Evidence—Impeachment—Coroner’s Inquest. — When a witness for the prosecution in a case of homicide testifies inconsistently with the testimony given by him at the coroner’s inquest, it is proper to call his attention to what he had testified to before the coroner, and upon his denial of such testimony, to prove by the coroner that he did so testify.

Id.—Reasonable Doubt—Burden of Proof. — Although section 1108 of the Penal Code provides that upon a trial for murder, the homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon him, it does not mean that he must prove such circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence, and he is only hound to produce such evidence as will create in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offense charged. People v. Hong Ah Duck, 61 Cal. 395, and People v. Eaten, 63 Cal. 422, overruled on this point.

Id. — Presumption as to Intention. — Every person is presumed to intend what his acts indicate his intention to have been, and if the evidence shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant fired a loaded pistol at the deceased and killed him, the law presumes that the defendant intended to kill the deceased, and unless it is shown, by the evidence, that his intention was otherwise, the law will not hold him guiltless.

Id.—Instruction — Excusable Homicide.—An instruction as to excusable homicide following the language of the code is proper.

Id. — Plight of Defendant—Assuming Crime in Instruction.—An instruction that the flight of a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after a crime has been committed with which he is charged, is a circumstance to he weighed by the jury, as tending in some degree to prove a consciousness of guilt, etc., and that if the jury find, from the evidence, that the deceased was killed as charged in the indictment, and that defendant immediately escaped, etc., it is a circumstance to be weighed by them, though not of itself establishing the guilt of the defendant, etc., is not objectionable as assuming that the crime charged against the defendant was committed.

Opinion — Works

Works, J. The defendant was charged with the crime of murder, and tried and convicted of manslaughter. His motion for a new trial was denied, and he appeals.

It is contended that the court below erred “in allowing purported testimony of the prosecuting witness, Hernandez, given at the coroner’s inquest, to be read in the presence and hearing of the jury, and in allowing the coroner to give evidence of the purported testimony given before him by Hernandez on that occasion, and that it erred in not striking out such evidence as hearsay.” The evidence referred to was introduced for the purpose of impeaching the witness Hernandez, who had been put upon the stand by the prosecution, and testified in such a way as to prejudice the people’s case, and inconsistently with the testimony given by him at the coroner’s inquest. It was proper, for this purpose, to call the attention of the witness to what he had testified before the coroner, and read the same in the presence of the jury, and upon his denial of said testimony, to prove that he did so testify. (Code Civ. Proc., secs. 2049, 2052.)

It is further contended that instructions 10, 11, 12, and 15, given by the court, were erroneous. The killing •of the deceased by the defendant was admitted, but it was claimed at the trial that the killing was done accidentally. In its ninth instruction, which is not objected to, the court instructed the jury as follows:—

“9. Upon a trial for murder, the commission of a homicide by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving circumstances of mitigation, or that justify or excuse it, devolves upon him, unless the proof on the [162]part of the prosecution tends to show- that the crime committed only amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justified or excusable.”

The instructions complained of are as follows:—

“ 10. Up to the moment when the killing is proved to have been committed by the. defendant, the prosecution must make out its; ease, beyond any reasonable doubt. When the killing is so> proved,, it devolves upon the defendant to show any circumstances of mitigation’ to excuse or justify it by a preponderance of evidence on his part; that is, the killing being proved, the defendant must make out his case in mitigation to excuse or justify it by some stronger proof in same appreciable degree than the proof af the prosecution. The burden of proof changes, and the proof on the part of the defendant must be in some degree stronger than the proof on the other side.” “11. Every person is presumed to intend what his acts indicate his intentions to have been; and if you find, from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant fired a loaded pistol at the deceased and killed him, the law presumes that the defendant intended to kill the deceased, and unless it is shown by the evidence that his intention was other than his acts indicated, the law will not hold him guiltless.”

People v. Bushton

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Synopsis

Opinion — Works

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Dissent — Thornton

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