Hanscom v. Drullard
Before: Foote
Synopsis
Sale of Newspaper—Fraudulent Representations—Evidence of Value — Identification. — In an action for damages for fraudulent representations by a vendor in the sale of the business, stock, and appurtenances of a newspaper, evidence of the value of the property sold at a time not remote from the time of sale is competent and relevant as tending to throw light upon the value at the time of sale; and the fact that the property was pointed out to the witness by one who knew it to be the property sold is a sufficient identification of the property the value of which is testified to.
Id.—Evidence as to Number of Subscribers—Harmless Error.— In such action, where evidence was allowed that when the newspaper sold by the defendant to the plaintiff was formerly sold to the defendant by a third party the number of subscribers was larger than the number shown by the books of the defendant at the time of the sale to plaintiff, such evidence could not have harmed the defendant, conceding without deciding that it was immaterial.
Id.—Modification of Instructions—Fraud—Preponderance of Evidence. — A modification of an instruction by making it read that fraud must be established by a preponderance of evidence, instead of by clear and convincing evidence, is not ground of reversal of the judgment, if the jury is elsewhere instructed that the evidence must be clear and convincing so as to satisfy the minds of the jury by a preponderance of evidence that the alleged fraudulent repesentations were false, and were made with intent to deceive and induce the plaintiff to enter into the contract, and did so deceive and induce him to enter therein, to his damage.
Id. — Fraudulent Prevention of Use of Means of Knowledse. — An instruction that plaintiff cannot recover in an action for fraudulent representations accompanying a sale, “unless he was deceived by the alleged representations, and if the means of knowledge are at hand, equally available to both parties, and the subject of purchase is alike open to their inspection, if the purchaser does not avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he has been deceived,” is properly modified by adding the words, “unless he was induced by the trick or misrepresentations of defendant not to make such inspection, ” if the evidence is such as to warrant the modification.
Id. —Liability for Willfully False Representations. —An instruction that if the representations made by defendant accompanying a sale to plaintiff as to the value of the property sold “were untrue, yet defendant would not be liable if he professed to rely on the knowledge of others, and gave the source of his information, which plaintiff consulted and found to be true,” is properly modified by adding the words “unless the defendant knew and had reason to believe that they were untrue.”
Foote, C. This is an action for damages alleged to have resulted from the practice by the defendant toward the plaintiff of false and fraudulent representations in the sale to the latter of the appurtenances, stock, and business of a newspaper.
The plaintiff recovered a judgment,.from which, and an order refusing a new trial, the defendant appeals.
The errors relied on for a reversal of the judgment and order are, that the court should not have admitted certain evidence for the plaintiff, and that it improperly gave certain instructions, modified some, and refused others.
The ground of objection to Maddrill’s testimony was, that it was not shown that the property about which he attempted to fix the value was identified as that sold to [236]plaintiff, and that his estimate was made about the time' of the trial, and not at the time of sale, and was therefore immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent.
The property was pointed out to the witness by Porter, who knew it. That was a sufficient identification. While the estimate of value was not made at the very time of the sale, it was made at a time not remote from it, and although not conclusive as to the value, it was. not immaterial, incompetent, or irrelevant, since it tended to throw some light upon the question of value, one of the matters in issue.
One of the questions put to Wagstaff, another witness, was not answered, the court sustaining the objection made. The other question asked him sought to elicit information as to the number of paying subscribers of the newspaper when, the witness sold it to the defendant, in 1887, some time before the sale to the plaintiff.
Conceding without deciding that the evidence was immaterial, yet it could not have harmed the defendant. He only claims, in his answer, upon information and belief, that he had more than 333 paying subscribers,— how many more is not stated. In his testimony upon the subject, he does not fix the number of such subscribers, or claim there were more than 333. Neither does he attempt to do so by his witness Medley, who, he says, knew more about the business than he did. While Hanscom, whose statement, which is not now claimed as immaterial, is derived from the defendant’s book, and is not controverted, states that there were 338 paying subscribers in May, June, and July, 1887, a short time after the sale by Wagstaff to Drullard.
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