Bartlett v. Odd FelLows' Savings Bank

California Supreme Court May 23, 1889 No. No. 11871Published

Before: Foote

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Holding. The court held that an attorney discharged without cause before completing a contingent-fee contract may recover the agreed-upon compensation once the underlying condition (the client's receipt of funds) is satisfied. The statute of limitations begins to run only when the client receives the funds and refuses payment, not at the time of discharge.

Issues

Whether an attorney's claim for compensation under a contingent-fee contract is barred by the statute of limitations if brought after the client's receipt of funds but more than the statutory period after the attorney's discharge.
Whether a complaint sufficiently alleges damages when it sets forth facts showing the defendant's breach of obligation and the resulting amount due under the contract.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“There can be no doubt that the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued when the defendant received the money and refused to pay him his share of it.”

Synopsis

Attorney and Client — Compensation—Entire Contract—Discharge op Attorney — Measure op Damages.—An attorney who receives a salary under a general employment by a corporation which may he changed at any time may properly make a special contract with the corporation for services in a particular case; and if discharged from such case without cause, may recover the amount of money to which he would have been entitled had the defendant allowed him to complete the entire service which he had contracted to perform, with interest from the time it became due.

Id. — Statute op Limitations. — When the compensation which an attorney is to receive is to depend for its time of payment upon the time when the corporation should obtain by judgment or compromise the payment of the claim sued upon and its amount is to be controlled by the amount so received, the cause of action for services does not accrue until the receipt of the money collected from the defendant; and no suit could he brought before that time for breach of contract in discharging the attorney from his employment.

Id—Breach op Contract — Pleading — Allegation op Damages.—A complaint showing a breach of contract by the defendant in refusing to pay an agreed compensation to the plaintiff as attorney, who was prevented by the defendant from fully performing the contract on bis part, and alleging that a certain sum of money and interest is due under the contract, is not insufficient in not containing a specific allegation of damages, the facts being stated which in law constitute his damages and their measure.

Foote, C. This action was brought by an attorney at law to recover a sum of money alleged to be due him by the defendant. Judgment passed for the plaintiff as prayed for, from which, and an order denying a new trial, the defendant appeals.

The points made for the reversal of the judgment and order are: —

1. That the facts set up in the complaint show that the action was not brought to recover compensation for services rendered as an attorney, but that the cause of action is founded upon a breach of contract by the defendant, and arose when the relation of attorney and client was terminated, and was therefore barred by the statute of limitations.

2. That the contract as alleged is of a kind where the presumption arises that it has been entered into without consideration, and under undue influence, and this presumption has not been overcome by the plaintiff.

3. That the contract alleged was entered into by the defendant while laboring under a mistake of fact, and that the defendant had a right under the law to rescind it.

4. That the complaint is insufficient in that it does [221]not contain an allegation of damages, and therefore is not sufficient to support the judgment.

The case as presented by the record is one where an attorney at law, who was the general attorney of the corporation, at a salary which might be changed at the option of the corporation, and whose period of employment as such was subject to the same condition, was voluntarily and without any effort, fraud, or undue influence on his part, employed specially by the corporation, through its proper officers, to perform certain special work, which he was ready and willing to perform, and did partially perform, but which the defendant prevented him from fully accomplishing through no fault of his.

The compensation of the attorney was to depend for its time of payment upon the time when the corporation should obtain by judgment or compromise the payment of a claim it had against William Sharon. Its amount was to be controlled by the amount received from said Sharon.

A certain sum of money was received from that source by the corporation, but before that time it had discharged the plaintiff from being its attorney, and on his demanding the amount of money which he claimed under the contract that he was entitled to have, payment was refused, and before the time of the running of the statute of limitations from the date of the reception of the money by the corporation, this suit was instituted.

Bartlett v. Odd FelLows' Savings Bank

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