First National Bank of Oakland v. Wolff
Before: Thornton
Synopsis
Alteration of Note—Immaterial Alteration.—A note is not avoided by immaterial alterations innocently made, which do not affect the obligation of the instrument, or change the meaning of the note.
Id. — Insertion of Rate of Interest. — If the insertion of a rate of interest in a note, to fill up a blank after its signature, was authorized, it would bind the maker. If not authorized, the note would bear interest at the legal rate, and the insertion of an unauthorized rate would not render the note void.
Accommodation Note—Collateral Security—Relevancy of Evidence. — In an action on an accommodation note, which was secured by aware-house receipt for grain, if the complaint alleges that the security had become valueless without the act or fault of the payee of the note, and that the grain had been removed, and was in litigation between third parties, it is proper and relevant to the issues to ask the one for whose accommodation the note was given in reference to his knowledge of the ownership and disposal of the grain; and the president of the plaintiff bank may properly testify as to inquiries made by him about the grain.
Id. —Evidence■—-Conversation. ■—■ Evidence of a conversation between the accommodation maker of a note and the one who received the money paid thereon, had after the discounting of a note by a bank, which was the payee, is not competent against the hank, if no one representing the bank is present; but if the hank proves such conversation by one of the parties thereto, the other party may testify regarding the conversation.
Evidence — Impeachment. — It is error to strike out the evidence of a witness called to sustain the reputation of another witness for truth, honesty, and integrity, against an attempted impeachment thereof, on the ground that the witness had never heard such reputation discussed, or talked with any one about it, if he states that he has known the witness personally for twenty-seven years, and knows what his reputation is, and that it is good.
Conduct of Trial — Order of Evidence — Discretion — Expert. — Allowing an expert to testify on behalf of defendant after he has rested his case, and plaintiff has introduced rebutting testimony, is within the discretion of the trial court, with which the appellate court will not interfere.
Judgment on Verdict—Directory Provision as to Time.—The failure of the clerk to enter judgment on the verdict within twenty-four hours after the verdict, as required by section 664 of the Code of Civil Procedure, does not affect the validity of the judgment afterwards entered. The provision of the statute upon that subject is merely directory.
Opinion — Thornton
Thornton, J. Action by plaintiff against defendant on a promissory note. Verdict and judgment passed for defendant. The appeal is prosecuted by plaintiff from an order denying its motion for a new trial.
The execution of the note was denied by the defendant, and the main issue was, whether or not the note sued on was or was not a forgery.
The note as offered in evidence was in these words:—
“$2,000. Oakland, Cal., Oct. 27, 1882.
“ One day after date, without grace, for value received, I promise to pay to the First National Bank in this city, to First National Bank of Oak’d, or order, two thousand dollars, payable in gold coin, with interest thereon in like gold coin from date until paid, at the rate of nine per cent per annum, payable monthly in advance.
“Secured by grain in Hayward’s warehouse.
“No. Receipt No. 124. “A. Wolff.”
[71]The plaintiff’s contention is, that the note was signed by Wolff as an accommodation to R. H. Bennett, who received the money on it on the 28th of October, 1882, from the plaintiff. When signed by Wolff the words “of Oak’d” were not in it, and the rate of interest was left blank. Bennett testified that the note was signed and handed to him by defendant, with rate of interest left blank, for the reason that they did not know what rate the bank would charge, and that he was empowered by Wolff to fill up the blank with the rate agreed on. He so informed the bank, and after some conversation with one of the officers of the bank, the rate of nine per cent per annum was agreed on, and the blank was so filled in by Bennett or at his instance. At the end of the note was written by Bennett, “Receipt No. 124.” The insertion of the words “of Oak’d” was immaterial. The form of the note used showed that the bank was the First National Bank of Oakland. The note was dated at “Oakland,” and the form used contained the words “at the First National Bank of this city.” This could mean no other bank than the First National Bank of Oakland, and therefore the insertion “of Oak’d” added nothing to the note that it did not mean before, and was immaterial.
The words “Receipt No. 124” were no part of the note, and did not affect its meaning in any way. The purport of these words was, that the receipt No. 124 was a security for the payment of the money for which the note was executed. We cannot see that they were material, or affected the note in any Way.
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