In re Tyler

Works, J. Proceedings were instituted in this court to disbar the respondent, which resulted in a judgment depriving him of the right to practice as attorney or counselor in any or all of the courts of this state, and [308]that he be suspended from the practice for the period of two years from the date of the judgment, “and until the judgment in favor of J. M. Hogan against the said respondent, mentioned and described in the accusation, shall be fully satisfied and paid, if the same shall not have been satisfied during such period of two years.” The facts upon which this judgment was rendered will be found in 71 Cal. 353.

The respondent in that proceeding now moves this court to strike out so much of the judgment as suspends him from the practice until the payment of the Hogan judgment, the two years for which he was suspended having expired. The motion is not based upon any new or additional facts, nor is it claimed that the judgment referred to has been paid in whole or in part, or any excuse shown for not having paid the same. The sole 'ground upon which relief is sought is, that this court had no power or jurisdiction to make an order suspending him for what is claimed to be an indefinite time.

The section of the code upon which the judgment is based is as follows: “ Upon conviction, in cases arising under the first subdivision of section 287, the judgment of the court must be, that the name of the party shall be stricken from th@ roll of attorneys and counselors of the court, and that he be precluded from practicing as such attorney or counselor in all the courts of this state; and; upon conviction in cases under the other subdivisions of that section, the judgment of the court may be according to the gravity of the offense charged,—deprivation of the right to practice as attorney or counselor in the courts of this state permanently or for limited period.” (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 299.) The point made is, that under this section the court could deprive him of the right to practice permanently, or for a limited period; that a limited period means a fixed and determinate period; and that the judgment rendered, being for an [309]uncertain time, depending upon the happening of an uncertain event, was not within the power conferred by the section, and is void.