Smith v. Los Angeles Immigration & Land Co-operative Ass'n
Synopsis
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, and from an order refusing a new trial.
The defendant pleaded an estoppel by a previous judgment rendered in a suit in equity brought by the defendant against the plaintiff and his assignor, which was alleged to have determined that the note here sued upon was made without any authority whatever, and was fraudulent and void. The findings and judgment offered in evidence did not in fact pass upon the validity of the note, but adjudged that a previous confession of judgment obtained therein by the plaintiff from the president and secretary of the corporation was fraudulent and void, and ordered the same to be set aside, and that the corporation be allowed to defend said action, and restrained the plaintiff from proceeding in the action, unless consenting to allow the judgment to be set aside and to proceed to a new trial against the corporation, which was accordingly done. The further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
The Court. This is a suit on a promissory note purporting to have been executed by one Garey, president of the corporation defendant, in his own favor, and assigned after maturity to the plaintiff;
[292]Conceding for the purpose of this decision that the sum for which the note was given was honestly due from the corporation to its president, the note was, nevertheless, invalid, unless authorized or ratified by the directors.
The judgment of the superior court in favor of plaintiff rests upon a finding that the execution of the note was duly authorized. But the evidence shows that the only authority to execute it was the following resolution: That “all notes held by T. A. Garey, and also by H. J. Crow, be renewed, and two per cent interest per month be allowed.”
There were seven directors of the corporation, and only four — a bare quorum, two of whom were Garey and Crow — were present at the meeting at which the above resolution was attempted to be passed.
It was essential to its adoption that a majority of the quorum should vote for it (Civ. Code, sec. 308); and clearly there could not have been such majority unless the vote of Garey or Crow was counted in the affirmative.
Garey testifies that he did not vote at all upon the resolution, and respondent contends that so far as it concerned the renewal of Garey’s notes, Crow was competent to act. But we cannot assent to this proposition. He was, we think, disqualified by his direct interest in the passage of that inseparable part of the resolution which authorized the renewal of his own notes.
We feel constrained to hold that the finding of an original authority to execute the note sued on is unsupported by the evidence.
As to the claim that the judgment of the superior court may be upheld on the ground that the corporation subsequently ratified the execution of the note, we can only say that upon this point the evidence is conflicting, and as the superior court has made no finding, we cannot supply one.
[293]
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