Brown v. Bank of Napa

Thornton, J. The principal question here presented is, whether an assignee in insolvency can maintain an action for the conversion of personal property against a vendee who has purchased such property of a vendor, [545]who had it in possession when the sale was made, which sale was not accompanied by an immediate delivery of the property sold to the vendee, and not followed by an immediate and continued change of possession.

The property in controversy was a quantity of wine. This was sold by William Reed on the 15th of September, 1884, to S. M. Chapman. There was no delivery to Chapman, and the wine remained, as before the sale, in Reed’s possession. This continued to be the case until May 4, 1885, when the wine was attached as the property of Reed in an action brought against him. The interest which Chapman had acquired from Reed passed to the defendant, the Bank of Napa, prior to the 4th of May, 1885. How long prior does not appear, nor does it appear that the bank paid anything to Chapman on acquiring his interest.

On the evening of the 4th of May, 1885, the officer (one Brown) who had seized the wine under the writ of attachment before mentioned was ordered to release it from levy, and at the same time received a written request from the defendant, the Bank of Napa, to act as its agent, and take and hold the wine for it. The officer (Brown) kept the wine as the agent of the bank, placed a keeper in charge of it, and retained it in his possession until the bank removed it, between the 10th and 15th of May, 1885, from Reed’s wine-cellar to the wine-cellar of Anduran and Carpy.

On the 5th of May, 1885, Reed commenced proceedings under the statute to be declared an insolvent, and subsequently procured a discharge. Smith Brown, the plaintiff, was in June, 1885, appointed assignee of Reed, and afterward qualified and acted as such. The action is brought by the plaintiff, assignee as above stated.

It is argued for the Bank of Napa, appellant here, that the sale to Chapman was not void as to the plaintiff, assignee in insolvency of the vendor Reed; that the plaintiff stood merely in the shoes of Reed, and that as the [546]sale was valid as to Reed, it was valid as to the assignee. We do not think that the contention is sound. The statute declares the sale is void as against his creditors while the vendor remains in possession, and the successors in interest of such creditors, and against any person on whom his estate devolves in trust for the benefit of others, and against purchasers and encumbrancers in good faith subsequent to the transfer.