Southern Pacific Railroad v. Purcell

Hayne, C. Ejectment. The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

1. The plaintiff introduced a patent from the United States, made in pursuance of a legislative grant. The defendant made a series of objections, all of which were based upon the ground that certain matters necessary to the validity of the patent had not been shown, and these objections are urged as reasons for the reversal of the judgment. The objections are not well taken. A patent, whether conclusive or not, is at least prima facie valid, and is presumptive evidence that all preliminary conditions had been fulfilled. (Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How. 88; Leviston v. Ryan, 75 Cal. 293; Whitney v. Morroio, 112 U. S. 695.)

2. The legislative grant excepts from its operation, among other things, lands tó which pre-emption or homestead claims were attached “at the time the line of said road is definitely fixed.” And the defendant contends that he is within the exception. The basis for this contention is, that he gave evidence showing that he was in possession before and at the time the line of the road was fixed; that he was a citizen of the United States over twenty-one years, and had made no homestead entry; that he settled upon the land for the purpose and with the intention of homesteading it; and that he “went to the land-office at Visalia, and asked the register of the office to be allowed to file a homestead entry for this land.” He further testified: “The offer of filing was rejected. I was not allowed to file homestead entry on the land.” This did not bring him within the exception. Nothing is said about his paying- or offering to pay the register’s fees, or about his making or tendering the necessary affidavit. (E. S., sec. 2290.) It may be that the register refused to allow his entry be[71]cause these conditions were not fulfilled. If such was not the fact, the defendant should have proved it, as the. burden in this regard was clearly upon him. So far as is shown, he appears not to have taken any further step. He therefore did not show that a “homestead claim” had attached to the land, and therefore did not bring himself within the terms of the exception. So far as is shown by the record, he was a mere occupant of the land. And it is well settled that mere occupancy of public land does not, of itself, give the occupant any right to the land, or prevent the government from disposing of it as it pleases. (Yosemite Valley Case, 15 Wall. 86; Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408.)

3. The defendant pleaded a former recovery by the company against him for the same land. The proof was, that an action of ejectment to recover the same property, and damages for its detention, had been commenced by the plaintiff herein against the defendant herein in the circuit court of the United States, and that judgment was entered for the plaintiff in January, 1880. So far as the damages are concerned, the cause of action is different. For the judgment in the present case is for “rents and profits of said premises from May 1, 1882.” With reference to the title to the land, it would seem to have been the same as that adjudicated in the former suit; and we do not see why it could not have been relied upon by plaintiff here as an estoppel against defendant. It most certainly does not aid the defendant in any way. The counsel for the defendant asks: “ Are the courts to be called upon to render two judgments for the same cause of action?” We do not see why not,—in cases like the present,—if the first judgment has not been obeyed. If the second action bad been commenced while the first was pending, the pendency of another action might have been a defense. But as the first suit resulted in a judgment several years before the second was commenced, we are at a loss to see how it can avail defendant in any way.