Turner v. McDonald

Belcher, C. C. On the nineteenth day of February, 1879, the defendant contracted to sell to one Woodworth a lot in the city of San Francisco for twenty thousand five hundred dollars, and received from him on account, and as a deposit to- secure the sale, the sum of five hundred dollars. The contract was made “upon the following terms, to which both parties are mutually bound: Ten days are to be allowed for legal search of title. If it is not found to be perfect, the deposit, for which this is a receipt, is to be returned; if the title is found perfect, and the sale is not consummated in accordance with the above terms, the deposit is to be forfeited.”

Within the ten days allowed, Woodworth submitted an abstract of title to John R. Jarboe,. an attorney at law, for examination, and was ready and willing to complete the purchase if Jarboe pronounced the title good. After examination Jarboe decided that the title was not perfect, and he informed defendant of his decision about the time it was made. Woodworth then demanded from the defendant a return of his deposit, and the defendant refused and neglected to pay back the money, but did [179]not, so far as appears, offer or tender to him any deed of the property.

Woodworth assigned his claim to the plaintiff, and this action was brought to recover back the five hundred dollars, with interest.

The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.

In support of the appeal, it is urged that the defendant’s title was in fact perfect, and the court should have so found from the evidence.

A perfect title must be one that is-good and valid beyond all reasonable doubt. Whether the title in particular cases is good or not is a question which it is often difficult to determine, and one upon which lawyers and judges sometimes disagree. “Though the court,” it has been said, “may entertain an opinion in favor of the title, yet if it be satisfied that that opinion may fairly and reasonably be questioned by other competent persons, it will refuse specific performance. Thus, in a case before Sir John Leach, he expressed the strong inclination of his opinion to be in favor of the title, and yet refused the relief sought by the plaintiff; and in the recent case of Pyrke v. Waddingham, in which the Vice-Chancellor Turner discussed the subject now before us, he expressed an opinion in favor of the title, but nevertheless dismissed the vendor’s bill, with costs. Still less, of course, will the court force a title on a purchaser in opposition to the decision of another court, though it may think that decision to be wrong.” (Fry on Specific Performance, sec. 579; see also Richmond v. Gray, 3 Allen, 25; Sturtevant v. Jaques, 14 Allen, 523.)