Parker v. Reay
Before: Paterson
Synopsis
Street Assessment—San Francisco — Street Crossing—Assessment Levied on Lot not Chargeable is Void.— Under subdivision 3 of section 8 of the act of April 1, 1872, an assessment for work dono on a main street crossing is void if made chargeable upon a lot or part of a lot which does not form a portion of the quarter block adjoining and cornering on. the crossing.
Id. — Separate Assessments and Demands—Invalidity oe One Assessment. — Where separate assessments are made for different portions of the work, and separate demands are made for the payment of each assessment, the invalidity of one of the assessments does not render the other invalid.
Practice—Findings — Insufficiency of Evidence — Specification of Particulars. —The sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding will not he reviewed unless the particulars in which the evidence is claimed to he insufficient are specifically stated. A mere specification that the “ evidence is insufficient to sustain the finding” is too general.
Paterson, J. 1. The assessments levied against lot 13 are separately made and particularly defined in the assessment list. The lot was properly assessed the sum of $647.41 for the construction of gutter-ways and macadam. The other assessment, $62.90, for the crossing on Scott and Tyler streets, should have been made against the east one half of the lot, and the diagram ought to have shown what portion was assessed. (Stats. 1871-72, sec. 8, subd. 3, p. 810.) This portion of the assessment was void, and the demand therefor was invalid; but the assessment for macadam and gutter-ways having been made separately and for the proper amount, and the proper demand having been made, as shown by the return, the motion for a nonsuit was properly denied, notwithstanding the invalidity of the assessment for work on the crossing.
2. The specifications as to the insufficiency of the evidence are too general. That “the evidence is insufficient,—1. To sustain the first finding of fact; 2. Or the second finding of fact; 3. Or the third finding of fact,” etc.,—is not a specification of “the particulars in which such evidence is alleged to be insufficient,” within the meaning of section 659 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Eddelbuttel v. Durrell, 55 Cal. 277.)
[106]We cannot, therefore, consider the point made by the appellant, that the evidence does not support the finding as to the amount due and unpaid.
3. The findings support the judgment.
Judgment and order affirmed.
Searls, C. J., and McKinstry, J., concurred.
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