Hunt v. Steese

California Supreme Court Apr 26, 1888 No. No. 11664Published

Before: Paterson

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that a preliminary injunction should be granted to preserve property pending a final determination of title when the plaintiff presents a prima facie case of ownership via patent, and the defendant's evidence of mineral character is insufficient to clearly overcome that title.

Issues

Whether a preliminary injunction should be granted to prevent irreparable injury to land pending a final determination of title.
Whether a patent for land can be defeated by evidence that the land was known to be mineral in character at the time of the grant.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The jurisdiction of the court in these cases is asserted for the preservation of the property pending proceedings at law for the determination of the title of the parties.”

Synopsis

Injunction—Waste when Restrained Pendente Lite—Ejectment.— In an action of ejectment, the plaintiff is entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendant from committing irreparable waste on the demanded premises pending the determination of the issue as to ownership, unless it appears that the title of the plaintiff is had, or at least, that there is no reasonable ground for the assertion of title by him. The mere existence of a doubt as to the title does not of itself constitute a sufficient ground for refusing the injunction.

Id. — Order Refusing Injunction — Appeal—Record — Findings.— On an appeal from an order refusing an injunction, it is not necessary to specify in a hill of exceptions the particulars in which the evidence is alleged to he insufficient, nor is the lower court required to make findings in support of the order. The appeal is heard upon the papers used on the hearing in the lower court; and the testimony of witnesses contained in the record, and identified by the judge as having been given on the hearing, will be treated on the appeal as written affidavits.

Railroad Grant—Mineral Character of Land how Determined.—A person claiming under a mineral location, to be entitled to the possession of land previously patented to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, in pursuance of the grant made to that company by the act of Congress of July 1, 1862, and the amendment thereto of July 2, 1864, in order to establish his right of possession as against a person claiming under the patent, must clearly show that at the date of the patent the land, under the conditions then existing, was more valuable for mining than for agriculture, and was known to be such. And in determining the relative value of the land for such purposes, subsequent changes in the conditions affecting it cannot be considered.

Paterson, J. Ejectment. Plaintiff moved for an injunction pendente lite, restraining the defendants from washing away the soil for mining purposes. The court granted a temporary restraining order, but on the hearing of the motion, refused to grant an injunction, and the order first made was revoked.

On the hearing plaintiff introduced his verified complaint, and a patent for certain lands, including the lands in controversy, from the United States to the Central Pacific Railroad Company, issued under a grant to that company by act of Congress passed July 1, 1862, and the amendment thereto of July 2,1864. This patent is dated February, 1875, and contains, after the granting clause, the following provision: “Yet excluding and excepting from the transfer by these presents all mineral lands, should any be found to exist in the tracts described in the foregoing.” Plaintiff also introduced in evidence a deed from the Central Pacific Railroad Company to himself, dated June 5, 1883, conveying the lands in controversy. This deed contains, after the description, these words: “Reserving, however, all claim of the United States to the same as mineral land.” It was shown by the plaintiff that he went into possession of the lands granted in 1877, and had used the lands for grazing purposes. In the winter of 1883-84 the land was inclosed by plaintiff with a fence. He testified that the defendants had deprived him of the use of the land since the fall of 1884; that the defendants were'mining and digging up and washing away good soil without authority. It was shown on behalf of the defendants that they had filed a [623]notice of location under the Revised Statutes of the United States, and had complied with the local mining laws and regulations; that they had entered upon the land for mining purposes under their claim of right. They were permitted, against the plaintiff’s objection, to introduce patrol testimony to show that the land was mineral land, and the court found “that at the time the patent of the United States issued to the plaintiff’s grantor, the land in controversy was known, and had been for several years prior thereto, to be valuable for minerals. That being the fact, no title to said land passed by said patent to plaintiff’s grantor, and of course none passed to plaintiff from the deed from said company.” The court denied the application for an injunction, upon the ground stated. The complaint alleged in substance that the plaintiff was the owner of the land; that the defendants were trespassing on his possession, washing away the soil, and removing gold therefrom; that they were insolvent, and threatened and intended to continue their trespasses; that the land is valuable for agricultural and grazing purposes; that defendants are “stripping away from its natural places of deposit the alluvium deposits of the soil, plowing up the soil, and scraping and piling it up to make reservoirs on the land, and digging ditches on the land to carry water to wash the soil therefrom.”

Hunt v. Steese

AI Brief

Synopsis

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

AI Brief