Carpenter v. Superior Court of San Joaquin Cty.

California Supreme Court Apr 21, 1888 No. No. 12395Published

Before: Hayne

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Holding. The court held that the superior court lacked the authority to set aside a verdict and judgment in a probate proceeding after a motion for a new trial had been denied, as the judgment was not void. The court further determined that the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem did not render the proceedings void because special probate provisions for representing minors were followed and substantially complied with.

Issues

Whether a superior court has the authority to set aside a verdict and judgment in a probate proceeding after a motion for a new trial has been denied.
Whether the failure to appoint a guardian ad litem in a probate proceeding renders the resulting judgment void.
Whether the general provisions for guardians ad litem in civil actions apply to probate proceedings.

Disposition. Demurrer overruled

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“After judgment upon the verdict had been entered and a motion for a new trial had been regularly made and denied, the court below was not authorized to set aside its action for mere error.”

Synopsis

Modes in Which a Decision may be Reviewed__Where a cause has been regularly heard and decided, it can be reviewed only in the modes provided by the statute. The trial court cannot upon an application not authorized by statute set aside its decision for mere error not amounting to want of jurisdiction.

Id. —Teems of Court. —This rule is not affected by the fact that terms of court have been abolished.

Id. — Orders Improvidently Made — Presumption.—The rule does not prevent the trial court from setting aside orders or judgments which were improvidently and unintentionally made. But it will not be presumed that an order or judgment was of that character; such a case must be affirmatively shown.

Review in Unauthorized Mode — Jurisdiction.—The objection that a court has reviewed its decision in an unauthorized mode goes to the power of the court; and its action may be annulled on certiorari.

Guardian ad Litem—Probate Proceedings—Attorney for Minors. — The provisions in relation to guardians ad litem for minor defendants, in the chapter on parties to civil actions, do not apply to probate proceedings. The special proceedings as to attorneys for minors govern the matter.

Id. — An attorney for minor defendants, appointed by the probate judge, after service of citation, to represent the minor upon a contest as to the validity of a will, is to all intents and purposes a guardian ad litem, although not called by that name.

Id. — It is not necessary that there should be a new guardian ad litem, every time a pleading is amended.

Hayne, C. Demurrer to a petition for a writ of certiorari. The facts shown by the petition are substantially as follows: —

A document purporting to be the will of Charles W. Carpenter, deceased, was admitted to probate, and letters testamentary were issued to the executor named therein. Subsequently, and within the year, the petitioners commenced proceedings to contest the validity of the will. A trial was had; the jury found against the validity of the will, and the court entered judgment accordingly. A motion for a new trial was made and denied. After all this had occurred, certain minors, for whom an attorney had been appointed by the court (through which attorney they had appeared and taken part in the proceeding), made a motion to have all the proceedings set aside, mainly on the ground that they had not been represented by a guardian ad litem. The court granted this motion, and set aside the verdict and judgment, and the application is for a writ to annul such action. The demurrer is on the ground that the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

After judgment upon the verdict had been entered and a motion for a new trial had been regularly made and denied, the court below was not authorized to set aside its action for mere error. (Coombs v. Hibberd, 43 Cal. 452; People v. Center, 61 Cal. 194; Odd Fellows’ Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 169; Dorland v. Cunningham, 66 Cal. 484; Lang v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 491.) The foundation of this rule is, that the modes in which a decision maybe reviewed are prescribed by statute, and the courts are not at liberty to substitute other modes in their place. Such being the foundation of the rule, it is not affected by the fact that terms of court are abolished; and the

[598]decision in Estate of Langan, 74 Cal. 353, has no appliplication. That case has reference to proceedings taken and orders made irregularly and through inadvertence. To such misprisions and inadvertencies the rule in question has no application. Thus where a motion for new trial was granted without any submission of the motion, and before the record upon the motion was completed, it was held to be proper for the aggrieved party to move to have the order granting the new trial set aside. (Morris v. De Celis, 41 Cal. 331; and see also Be Gaze v. Lynch, 42 Cal. 363; Hall v. Polack, 42 Cal. 218.) In such cases the fact that the order was irregularly and improvidently made takes it out of the general rule. (Compare Rousset v. Boyle, 45 Cal. 69.) Such a state of things, being of rare occurrence, is not presumed, but must be affirmatively shown.

Carpenter v. Superior Court of San Joaquin Cty.

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