Booth v. Hoskins
Before: Belcher
Synopsis
Written Contract—Loan—Parol Agreement to Extend Time of Payment. — Where a contract of loan is executed in writing, a parol agreement to extend the time of payment, if made at the time of the loan, cannot change the terms of or he substituted for the written contract; and if made subsequently, cannot create a new or continuing contract, so as to take the original contract out of the operation of the statute of limitations.
Mortgage—Deed to Secure Indebtedness.—A deed absolute on its face accompanied by a contemporaneous defeasance showing that it was made to secure the payment of a sum of money loaned by the grantee to the grantor, and payable at a future day with interest, is a mortgage.
Id. — Bar of Mortgage Debt — Foreclosure.—A mortgagee is not entitled to have his mortgage foreclosed, when the debt to secure which it was given is barred by the statute of limitations.
Id.—Quieting Title by Mortgagor—Payment of Debt—Condition. — In an action by the mortgagor, brought after the mortgage debt had become barred by the statute of limitations, to quiet his title against the claim asserted by the mortgagee under the mortgage deed, the court may impose, as a condition to the relief asked, that the plaintiff first pays the amount of the mortgage debt.
Opinion — Belcher
Belcher, C. C. —The plaintiffs commenced this action on the twenty-ninth day of July, 1885, to quiet their title to a quarter-section of land in Placer County. By his answer, the defendant denied that the plaintiffs, or either of them, had owned the land in question since the thirteenth day of July, 1878, admitted that he claimed to own it, and by way of cross-complaint al[272]leged that, on the thirteenth day of July, 1878, the plaintiff Booth was the sole owner of the land, and on that day, for and in consideration of the sum of $408, gold coin, paid to him by defendant, executed and delivered to defendant a good and sufficient deed of the same, and thereby the defendant became, ever since has been, and now is, the owner thereof. And the prayer was, that the defendant’s title be quieted as against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs answered the cross-complaint and admitted the execution of the deed as alleged, but averred that it was a quitclaim deed, and was made for and as a mortgage, and was so understood and intended by the parties thereto, to secure the payment of $408, with interest thereon at the rate of one and one quarter per cent per month, due from Booth to the defendant for money loaned and advanced to him by defendant; and then further averred that all claim and demand which defendant may have had against Booth, on account of the money so loaned and advanced, was, before the commencement of the action, barred by the provisions of sections 337 and 339 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
At the trial, the deed referred to, being an ordinary quitclaim deed, was introduced in evidence, and also a paper signed by both parties, which reads as follows: “This agreement, made and entered into this thirteenth day of July, 1878, by and between Edward Booth of Placer County, state of California, and J. H. Hoskins, also of said county and state, witnesseth: That whereas, the said party of the first part has entered at the Sacramento land-office [describing the quarter-section in controversy]; and whereas, said party of the second part has furnished the said party of the first part $408, in United States gold coin, for the said above-described land; and whereas, to secure the party of the second part, the said Edward Booth has this day deeded to J. H. Hoskins his right, title, and interest in the above-described land,— now, therefore, this agreement witnesseth: That if the [273]
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