Ward v. Dougherty

California Supreme Court Mar 14, 1888 No. No. 11085Published

Before: Searls

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Holding. The court held that the production of a duly executed and recorded deed by a successor in interest is sufficient evidence of its delivery, and that a judgment of foreclosure, fair on its face, cannot be collaterally attacked by parol evidence. Furthermore, a quitclaim deed executed by a purchaser at a sheriff's sale prior to receiving a sheriff's deed effectively transfers the purchaser's interest.

Issues

Whether the production of a deed by a successor in interest constitutes sufficient evidence of its delivery.
Whether a judgment of foreclosure, fair on its face, is subject to collateral attack via parol evidence.
Whether a quitclaim deed executed by a purchaser at a sheriff's sale before the issuance of a sheriff's deed is valid.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Possession of a deed of property, however, by the grantee therein named, and upon the same principle by one holding by conveyance of the same property under him, is prima facie evidence of its delivery.”

“the decree, being fair on its face, and rendered in a case where the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the person of defendant, is not subject to collateral attack.”

Synopsis

Deed — Possession by Grantee—Delivery.—The possession of a deed by the grantee named therein, or by a person claiming under him, is prima facie evidence of its delivery.

Id. —Date of Delivery —Presumption. —Under section 1055 of the Civil Code, a deed duly executed is presumed to have been delivered at its date.

Id.—Identity of Grantor—Presumption from Identity of Name.— In an action to quiet title by a person claiming under a deed from a grantor having the same name as the defendant, the identity of the grantor with the defendant is presumed from the identity of name. Judgment—Foreclosure of Street Assessment—Collateral Attack. — A decree foreclosing the lien of a street assessment which is valid on its face, and rendered in an action in which the court bad jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the person of the defendant, cannot he collaterally attacked by a person claiming under Mm, by showing that prior to the decree the assessment in question had been paid.

Sheriff’s Deed—Assignment of Certificate of Purchase — Subsequent Deed to Purchaser. —Where a purchaser of land at a sheriff’s sale, after the time for redemption has expired, quitclaims his interest in the land before a sheriff’s deed is given, the quitclaim deed is equivalent to an assignment of the sheriff’s certificate of sale, and if the sheriff afterward execute a deed to the purchaser, the same is void as between the parties.

Searls, C. J. —This is an action to quiet title to a lot of land at the corner of Van Ness Avenue and Broadway, San Francisco.

Plaintiff deraigned title through a quitclaim deed executed by the defendant, John Dougherty, on the fourteenth day of June, 1870, to one Patrick J. Tannian, and recorded June 18, 1870, at the request of one Julius George.

Plaintiff in further support of title in herself, introduced a deed from P. J. White, sheriff of the city and county of San Francisco, to James Gaffney (under whom plaintiff claims by sundry mesne conveyances), dated July 5,1883, and executed pursuant to a decree, order of sale, and sale, in the case of James Gaffney v. Barnaby Dougherty, in an action to foreclose the lien of a street assessment, under a contract made the ninth day of September, 1866.

It appears from the judgment roll that Denis Mahoney, one of the defendants in the action, set up in a cross-complaint the prior lien upon the property of a mortgage thereon executed May 26,1864, by Barnaby Dougherty to David Mahoney and assigned to him, the said Denis Mahoney, by the mortgagee, David Mahoney.

The lien of the street assessment was declared to be paramount to that of the mortgage. Date of decree, December 14, 1867; date of sale thereunder, January 22, 1868.

Defendant claims title to the premises under a sheriff’s deed dated July 3,1883, and executed pursuant to a foreclosure and sale of the premises under the mortgage above mentioned, in an action in which Denis Mahoney was plaintiff, and B. Dougherty defendant. Decree entered March 19, 1868; sale April 14, 1868, to Denis Mahoney, who received a certificate of sale and assigned the same to the defendant on the twenty-second day of September, 1868, with all his right, title, and interest in the premises.

[242]James Gaffney was made a party defendant in this last-named action, but there was a dismissal as to him, and no decree was taken against him.

Upon the closing of the testimony on the part of plaintiff, defendant moved for judgment as in case of non-suit, upon the ground that there was no proof of delivery of the deed from defendant Dougherty to P. J. Tannian. The motion was overruled, and this action is assigned as error.

We find in the record no specification of the particulars in which the evidence is alleged to be insufficient, but, waiving this point, we think there was sufficient evidence of the delivery of the deed by the defendant to the . grantee therein named. It was regularly executed,-acknowledged, and recorded as a conveyance of title to the' premises in dispute. It formed a part of the regular chain of title from the defendant to plaintiff, and was produced and offered in evidence at the trial by the attorney of the latter.

Ward v. Dougherty

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