Houghton v. Allen
Before: McFarland, Patebson
Synopsis
Vendor and Vendee—Contract fob Sale of Land—Mortgage by Vendee— Subsequent Conveyance by Vendor—Foreclosure.—On the 22d of August, 1870, one Jackson, the owner of the land in controversy, entered into a written contract with the defendant Allen, whereby he agreed to convey the same to him on the twenty-second day of August, 1872, provided Allen paid him a certain amount in cash, and the balance on certain subsequent dates. The contract provided that time should be of its essence, and that if Allen made default in the deferred payments, Jackson should be released from the obligation of performance, and should sell the land at public auction for cash, and out of the proceeds should retain the amount due him on the contract, together with the expenses of sale, and pay the overplus, if any, to Allen. This contract was not recorded until the 9th of July, 1872. Allen went into possession under the contract, and while in possession, on the 6th of April, 1871, mortgaged the lands to the plaintiff. Allen made default in the deferred payments, and the plaintiff never paid or offered to pay the same. On the 12th of January, 1872, Jackson, with the consent of Allen, for a valuable consideration, conveyed the land to the defendant Dresbach, who knew of the contract between Jackson and Allen. No demand was ever made upon Jackson or Dresbach to sell the land at public auction. Held, that the title acquired by Dresbach was adverse to that acquired by the plaintiff under his mortgage from Allen, and was not subject thereto, and could not be cut off in an action to foreclose the mortgage.
Opinion — McFarland
McFarland, J. — After a full consideration of this case in Bank, we have reached the conclusion that the judgment of the court below should be affirmed.
The action is brought by plaintiff, Houghton, to foreclose a mortgage executed to him on April 6, 1871, by defendant Allen. The mortgage includes certain land not in contest here; and also lots 6, 7, and 8,—the premises in controversy.
The court below rendered judgment foreclosing the mortgage as to the other land, but refused to include lots 6, 7, and 8 in the decree. From the last-named part of thé judgment plaintiff appeals.
The complaint is in the usual form, and proceeds upon the theory that Allen was the owner in fee of the lots in question. The averments as to those lots are the same as the averments as to the other property included in the mortgage. If the theory of the complaint had been carried out in the judgment, all right of defendant Dresbach in the said lots would have been foreclosed, and as against him the purchaser at the foreclosure sale would have taken an unencumbered fee-simple title.
[104]But Allen was- not the owner of the lots. On the twenty-second day of August, 1870, these lots were owned in fee by John P. Jackson; and on said day Jackson made a written contract with Allen by which he agreed to convey them to Allen on the twenty-second day of August, 1872, provided Allen would pay, him fifty dollars in cash, and one hundred dollars on August 22,1881, and one hundred dollars on August 22, 1882,—the two deferred payments to bear interest at twelve per cent per annum. It was provided that time should be considered as of the essence of the contract; and that if Allen failed or neglected to make either of the payments, Jackson should be wholly released and discharged of any claim at law or in equity for a performance of the contract, etc. Allen paid the fifty dollars, and went into possession. While in possession—and on April 6, 1871—he executed to Houghton the mortgage above referred to, which included these lots. But when the first one hundred dollars became due, Allen failed to pay any part of it, and has totally neglected to pay any part of either of the deferred payments; and Houghton never paid or offered to pay anything on the contract. On the twelfth day of January, 1872, Jackson, for a consideration of $250, conveyed the lots to the defendant Dresbach. The contract between Jackson and Allen was not recorded until July 9,1872; but when Jackson conveyed to Dresbach, Allen, being in default, consented to the conveyance, and to deliver the possession to Dresbach. The deed to Dresbach recited that there had been a con-' tract with Allen, and that the conveyance was made at Allen's request. This was the first notice, so far as it appears, which Dresbach had of the character of Allen's possession.
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