Morgan v. Hecker

Foote, C. Hecker, the respondent here, was a creditor of W. J. Morgan, the husband of the plaintiff, in the sum of two hundred dollars. While he, the husband, was so indebted, Belle M. Morgan, the plaintiff, received from him, as a gift, and without any valuable consideration, a certain mare of the value of two hundred dollars, a buggy of the value of seventy-five dollars, and a set of harness of the value of fifteen dollars, all of which property was taken possession of by her, and used as her own, until levied upon by an execution issuing out of a justice’s court by virtue of a judgment recovered against W. J. Morgan by the respondent, Hecker. The property was sold under the execution and bought in by Hecker. This suit was instituted by Belle M. Morgan to recover the property or its value.

[542]The court below gave judgment in favor of Hecker, and from that the plaintiff has appealed upon the judgment roll only.

From the findings it appears, in addition to the facts heretofore stated, “ that the said Morgan, the husband of the said plaintiff, was, at the time of the gift of the said personal property to his said wife, the plaintiff herein, in solvent financial circumstances, being the owner of real and personal property of the value largely in excess of the value of the property given to his said wife, and more than sufficient to meet all of his then existing liabilities, and enjoying and receiving a salary of $166.66 per month.”

There is no finding that in making the gift there was any intent on the part of W. J. Morgan to hinder, delay, or defraud his creditors. Nor is it found that he owed any other debt than the one to Hecker.

From the conclusions of law, it is evident that the court below held the gift of the personal property involved in the action to have been void as to Hecker, an existing creditor, solely because the husband owed that debt at the time he made the gift.

Formerly, it was a much vexed and doubtful question, so divided were different judges in their opinions upon the subject, whether or not a gift made of any of his property by one indebted was absolutely void as to existing creditors.

Judge Kent, in Reade v. Livingston, 3 Johns. Ch. 481, having gone to the full extent of holding any such gift fraudulent and void; while the supreme court of Connecticut, in Salmon v. Bennett, 1 Conn. 553, the supreme court of New York, in Seward v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 438, 455, 456, the supreme court of the United States, in Hinds v. Longworth, 11 Wheat. 213, and in Kehr v. Smith, 20 Wall. 31, 35, seem to repudiate so extreme a rule upon the subject, and hold that a voluntary gift without consideration only creates a prima facie presumption of an