People v. Williams

Temple, J. — The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, and now appeals from the judgment, and from an order denying his motion for a new trial.

The only point raised on the appeal which I deem it necessary to consider arises on instruction 20, given at the request of the prosecution. It is as follows:—

“ If the jury believe, from the evidence, that on the day of the homicide Clark came to the town of Monticello, and that Williams, seeing or meeting him on the street, spoke' to Clark, and said he wanted to see him, and requested Clark to go to the shade on the north side of Fowler’s saloon, and if, when they had reached the shade, Williams informed Clark of what he had heard [532]that Clark had said about Williams mistreating his wife, or poisoning his wife, and asked Clark to retract it or take it back, or words to that effect, and that Clark refused to retract or take back what he had said, and that then Williams, without further cause or provocation, shot and killed Clark, then Williams committed murder of the first degree, and you should so find.”

This instruction seems to omit the element of premeditation "and deliberation in defining murder in the first degree. Before giving this instruction, the court had fully and in various forms defined murder in the first degree, and murder in the second degree.

■ The first contention on the part of the people is, that under such circumstances the instruction, though erroneous, could not have misled the jury to the injury of the appellant. But it is plain that this position cannot be maintained. If a trial judge, in his charge to the jury, recites certain alleged facts which there is some evidence tending to prove, and then tells the jury that, if such facts' are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, they must find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree; and such charge is erroneous because the alleged facts do not, as matter of law, constitute murder in the first degree,>—it is prejudicial error, which is not cured by the fact that a full and correct definition of the offense had previously been given. Under this instruction, the jury, having found that the recited facts existed, were bound to find the defendant guilty of murder in the first degree, and they had no further use for a definition of the offense. They were expressly told that all the elements of the crime were there, and they must find the defendant guilty.