Waterman v. Morrill (1887) · DecisionDepot

Waterman v. Morrill

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Feb 17, 1887 No. No. 9463Published

Before: Paterson, Thornton

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Holding. A judgment cannot be barred by a prior action unless that action has culminated in a final judgment on the merits, and a court cannot presume a payment was previously credited without evidence of such final adjudication.

Issues

Whether a prior pending action in which a payment was pleaded acts as a bar to claiming that same payment in a subsequent action.
Whether a court may presume a payment was allowed in a prior action without evidence of a final judgment on the merits.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“before the defendants can be estopped in this case from claiming the benefit of their plea of payment, it must appear that they have had the benefit of the payment pleaded in the former suit.”

Synopsis

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, and from an order refusing-a new trial.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court, .

Opinion — Paterson

Paterson, J. This action was brought by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendants the value of certain lumber manufactured by them out of trees cut from [49]land of the plaintiffs, during the months of September and October, 1882, and June, 1883, pursuant to the provisions of a certain contract in writing made by and between the respective parties, on the eleventh day of April, 1881. In respect to the averments of the complaint, the answer of the defendants only put in issue the quantity of lumber manufactured by them during the months mentioned, and the plaintiffs, upon the trial, were content to rest upon the admissions in that particular. But defendants pleaded in their answer that they had paid to plaintiffs in advance, on the 31st of December, 1881, the sum of $1,225.88 on account of said lumber so cut, and $75.73 in boarding an agent of plaintiffs at defendants’ mill, during the times mentioned in the complaint, and pursuant to the terms of the contract. These allegations of the answér being deemed denied, the defendants at the trial proved the payment to plaintiffs on December 31, 1881, of $1,225.88, and in rebuttal plaintiffs, against the objection and exception of defendants, were permitted to introduce in evidence the complaint and answer in a case brought by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants under the same contract, for stumpage claimed by plaintiffs to be due thereunder for the month of November, 1882, and to and including the month of May, 1883, and in which action defendants by their said answer pleaded the same payment of $1,225.88; and plaintiffs herein also gave evidence tending to show that on the trial of the last-mentioned action proof was given of the said payment.

In the present case the court below found: —

“ 5. That on the thirty-first day of December, 1881, said defendants paid to; said plaintiffs, in advance, for and on account of timber to be cut under said contract, and taken from said lands of said plaintiffs, the sum of $1,225.88.

“ 6. Which said payment was claimed by the said defendants, and allowed by the court in a certain action [50]

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Dissent — Thornton

Thornton, J., dissenting. — I dissent. I am of opinion that the fact was substantially found on the issue of the payment pleaded. The finding is that there was no payment. When a cause between the same parties has been tried in which the same payment was pleaded and the issue tried, the trial commencing on the 24th of September, 1883, and continuing until the 26th, and the trial of a cause between the same parties commencing [52]on the 26th of September, 1883, in which the same payment is also pleaded and the issue tried, and the court finds that the payment was allowed in the action first tried, it is equivalent to a finding that no payment has been made in the action on trial. (See findings set forth in the opinion of the court.)

It is said that there is no evidence which sustained the finding that there is no payment, or that it was allowed in the cause first tried, because it does not appear by findings filed that the payment was allowed in such action. But there was sufficient evidence before the court to show that the payment should not be allowed in this cause, and in my opinion the court so finds. The record shows that the two actions were on the same contract, and that the same payment was pleaded in both, and that there was evidence of the payment in the other case. It is conceded that if allowed in both cases it would be allowed twice. This was evidence enough to justify a finding of the payment in the action, first tried, and to authorize a finding against it in this action, which finding in my opinion was made.

We have a right to presume that the findings have been long since filed in the cause first tried, and this court has the power under the constitution to send an order to the clerk of the trial court to have the judgment roll certified to this court, and to inspect it; and if it appears that the payment was allowed in that cause, to affirm the judgment in this. This obviates the necessity of sending this cause back for a new trial, which trial must be a mere form, causing unnecessary expense to the parties.

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Synopsis

Opinion — Paterson

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Dissent — Thornton

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