Wiggin v. Superior Court

Searls, C. — This is an application for a writ of prohibition against the judge of the Superior Court [399](Department 9) in and for the city and county of San Francisco, commanding him to desist from further proceedings in the matter of the estate of Hannah Murphy, deceased, upon the ground that the threatened action of said court is in excess of its jurisdiction.

Samuel B. Wiggin, the petitioner, was the administrator of the estate of Hannah Murphy, deceased.

On the nineteenth day of January, 1885, the Superior Court settled the final account of the administrator, and entered a decree of distribution of the property of the estate remaining in his hands.

On the twenty-sixth day of January, 1885, a decree of final discharge of petitioner, as administrator, was entered in the usual form in such cases.

On the twenty-seventh day of January, 1885, on the application of counsel for certain of the heirs of deceased, the court made an order setting aside and vacating the decree of final discharge, reciting therein that suchdecree of final discharge was entered and “made inadvertently and ex parte” and further ordering that the application of petitioner for a final discharge be heard January 28, 1885. Thereafter, and on the nineteenth day of May, 1885, the court issued an order for petitioner to show cause why he should not pay certain moneys ordered to be distributed to the heirs, or be dealt with by the court for disobedience to the decree of distribution. Petitioner appeared and objected to the jurisdiction of the court, contending that by the decree of final discharge of January 26th the court lost all jurisdiction over the matter, and the court disregarding the objection and being about to proceed in the premises, this application is made.

The question turns upon the authority of the court to set aside and annul the decree of final discharge of the petitioner as administrator. .

If the court had jurisdiction to annul that decree, its authority to proceed in the cause as if no discharge had [400]been granted, to enforce its decree of distribution, and to punish petitioner for contempt if he shall contumaciously refuse to obey the orders of the court for the payment to heirs of the moneys in his hands and decreed to be paid to them, cannot be successfully contradicted.