De Arguello v. Bours (1885) · DecisionDepot

De Arguello v. Bours

Name: California Superior Court Tentative Rulings
Creator: DecisionDepot
License: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/

California Supreme Court Sep 21, 1885 No. No. 8014Published

Before: McKinstry

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Holding. A deed is insufficient to pass legal title if the grantee's name was inserted without the grantor's authority, and a defendant in an ejectment action may assert a perfect equitable title as a defense if all facts supporting that equity are fully pleaded in the answer.

Issues

Whether a deed is valid to pass legal title if the grantee's name was inserted without the grantor's authority.
Whether a defendant in an ejectment action may rely on an equitable title as a defense.
Whether the defendant's equitable defense must be fully set forth in the answer.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Certainly the deed did not convey the legal title if Arguello never authorized the insertion of the name of defendant.”

“A perfect equity, united to the possession, is under our system equivalent for all purposes of defense to a legal title.”

“But all the facts on which he relies should be averred in the answer.”

Synopsis

Reed—Pilling in Blank aftee Execution—Leqal Title.—A deed in which the name of the grantee is left blank by the grantor at the time of its execution, and afterward inserted without his authority, does not convey any title, nor does it become sufficient for the purpose of passing the legal title from the fact that the grantee enters into possession and pays the purchase price.

Ejectment—Equitable Defense—Pleading.—In an action of ejectment, where the plaintiff has the legal title, and the defendant is in possession under a contract of purchase from one under whom the plaintiff claims, and has fully complied with the terms of the contract, the equitable title thus vested in the defendant may be pleaded in defense of the action. The facts constituting the defense must he fully stated in the answer, but a prayer for equitable relief is not required, nor is it material that the defendant may by lapse of time or other cause have lost his right to such relief.

McKinstry, J. This action is ejectment, brought by plaintiff as devisee under the will of José R. Arguello, deceased; the com[448]plaint alleging that José R. Arguello was seized in fee of the premises at the time of his death.

The answer admits that José It. Arguello was in his lifetime, and up to the 14th day of September, 1876, the owner in fee of the premises, but alleges that, on that day, he sold and conveyed said premises to the defendant for the consideration of $4,000, which was the full value thereof, and which sum was on that day fully paid by defendant Bours to said Arguello, and that said defendant entered into possession of said premises under said sale and not otherwise. That said defendant is and since said 14th day of September, 1876, has. been the owner in fee of said premises, and that defendant F. A. Buhl, at the time of the commencement of this suit, occupied and now occupies said premises as the tenant of the defendant Bours, and said Buhl has and claims no right, etc., except as tenant, etc.

If the foregoing is to be construed as being, in legal effect, merely a denial of the averments of the complaint, the court below erred in refusing to give to the jury the instruction asked by counsel for the plaintiff, which reads as follows: —

“If the jury believe from the evidence that when the deed offered in evidence herein, and dated September 14, 1876, came into the hands of the defendant B. W. Bours, it had already been signed and acknowleged by J. B. Arguello, and that, the name of B. W. Bours did not then appear therein, and that afterwards one Inglis, by direction of said Bours, in the absence of said Arguello, and without any authority from him, wrote the name of said Bours therein, and that thereupon said Bours took said deed and filed the same for record, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict.”

Certainly the deed did not convey the legal title if Arguello never authorized the insertion of the name of defendant. That such authorization might be proved by circumstantial evidence does not affect the decision of the question.

Bor is the decision of the question affected by the abolition of all distinctions between sealed and unsealed instruments. (Civ. Code, § 1629.) As to unsealed instruments, a blank could always be filled in by a person authorized by the maker. But the instruction above recited speaks of the absence of “any” authority from José B. Arguello for the insertion of the name of Bours. .

De Arguello v. Bours

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