Sullivan v. Mier
Before: Foote
Synopsis
Street Assessment in Sacramento—Foreclosure under Act of March 16, 1864—Plaintiff—Judgment.—The people of the State of California, and not the city of Sacramento, is the proper plaintiff in an action, brought under the Act of March 16, 1864, to foreclose a street assessment in the city of Sacramento. If such an action be brought in the name of the city as plaintiff, the judgment therein is void, although rendered in favor of the people of the State as well as the city.
Id.—Act of March 16, 1864, Constitutional.—The provision of the Act of March 16, 1864, requiring the action to bo brought in the name of the people of the State of California, is constitutional
Foote, C. In the trial court, the plaintiff W. L. Sullivan sued Fred Mier and Conrad Zwickel in an action of ejectment for a lot of land in the city of Sacramento.
The plaintiff introduced in evidence, as part of his chain of title, a judgment roll and a sheriff's deed.
The judgment roll disclosed the fact that the complaint was filed and summons issued on the 22d day of July, 1864; that the action was commenced on that day. The action was for a delinquent street assessment due the city of Sacramento. The law by virtue of which such actions could he brought is to be found on page 183 of the Legislative Acts of 1863-64, of date March 16, 1864, so that the action under discussion was of necessity governed in its proceedings by the Act of March 16, 1864, above referred to.
Upon examination it is discovered that the provisions of that law required in all cases that the complaint should name the people of the State of California as plaintiffs, and not the city of Sacramento. It will be found also that this act was in relation to suits of a special character, viz.: “For municipal or levee taxes or street assessments. (See § 2 of said act.)
[265]The action for delinquent street assessment, by virtue of the proceedings in which, and the judgment had and made therein, the plaintiff in the action of ejectment now on appeal here claimed title to the premises involved in that action, was not brought in the name of the people of the State of California as plaintiffs, but was brought in the name of the city of Sacramento, as the complaint, a part of the judgment roll therein, unmistakably shows; nor does it appear anywhere upon the record that any other party was ever legally joined with the city of Sacramento as plaintiff. The cause then proceeded to judgment, and the judgment or decree of foreclosure and order of sale in the action was entered in favor of the people of the State of California and the city of Sacramento as plaintiffs. If the court which rendered this judgment or decree and order of sale had no jurisdiction to do so, then they were void.
The action was a special one in its nature, and this court said in Richardson v. Tobin, 45 Cal. 30, which was an action for a street assessment: “ The counsel for the defendant also raises the point that it was not within the constitutional power of the legislature to prescribe the requirements of a complaint in this class of actions. But we apprehend the counsel does not seriously urge this point, after the admission in his reply brief that ‘ after the most thorough investigation of all the works ou constitutional law, and of the latest digests, there can be found no law limiting the powers of the legislature to regulate the pleadings 3 in cases like the present.”
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