California Southern Railroad v. Southern Pacific Railroad
Synopsis
Eminent Domain—Railroads—Right of Way—Joinder of Proceedings.— Under section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure a proceeding by a railroad corporation to acquire a right of way across the right of way of another railroad company, and a proceeding to acquire a right of way over lands which the defendant owns in fee, may be united.
Id.—Pleading—Allegation of Termini of Route. —The complaint, after stating the general route of the proposed road, alleged that the termini were to he National City and “a connection with the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company at or near the thirty-fourth parallel of north latitude in the State of California.” Held, that the termini were alleged with sufficient certainty.
Id.—Consolidation of Railroads—Articles of Incorporation.—Under section 473 of the Civil Code, and section 40 of the Act of 1861, upon the consolidation of two railroad corporations, the articles of consolidation constitute new articles of incorporation, and should be filed in the office of the secretary of State.
Id. — Improvements—When not Included in Compensation.—The value of improvements erected by the plaintiff on the land sought to be condemned, with the consent of the defendant, must not he considered in, determining the compensation to he awarded for the land.
Id.—Manner of Crossing—Question for Jury.—The question whether the manner of crossing is compatible with the greatest public benefit and least private injury, is one of fact to be determined with reference to the circumstances of the case.
Id. — Verdict — New Trial — Jury__So far as the value of the property
to he taken is concerned, the verdict of the jury is conclusive, although perhaps a new trial may be allowed by the court. All other issues of fact may be submitted to the jury.
Id.—Judgment — Signature by Judge—Entry—The judgment need not be signed by the judge. The presumption is that the judgment as entered by the cleric was authorized.
Ib. — Final Judgment—Final Order of Condemnation—Appeal.—In such proceedings the judgment on the assessment of damages, and adjudicating that the use is public, the taking necessary, etc., is the final judgment; the final order of condemnation is a special order made after final judgment, and an appeal therefrom must be taken within sixty days after its entry.
Id.— Complaint—Value of Property.—The complaint need not allege the value of the property sought to be condemned.
Id. — Cost of Fences—When not an Element of Damage.—In the absence of circumstances making the cost of fences an element of damage, the provisions of the statute imposing on a railroad company the duty of fencing its road or to pay for fencing, do not affect the question as to the compensation to be paid for taking the land or imposing an easement upon it.
The Court. 1. It is contended by appellants that the court below ought to have sustained the demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint, taken on the ground of a misjoinder of causes of action; that a proceeding to ascertain compensation for mossing one railroad by another cannot be united with a proceeding to acquire lands for depot buildings. It is urged that the defendant, the Southern Pacific, has only an easement, that such easement is not an estate in lands, and that section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure only permits all parcels of land required for the same public use to be included in the same proceeding. But here the proceeding is to acquire a right of way across the right of way of the defendant railroad company (which the statutes allow), and to acquire a right of way over lands of the defendant. In such case an easement is sought to be acquired, as is provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 1239). If the easement is not technically an estate in the land, the acquisition of [61]the right of way involves the taking of a parcel of land, within the meaning of the statute. It has never been doubted that proceedings to condemn two or more parcels for the purpose of the right of way may be united under section 1244, although the result may not be to transfer the fee, or any estate in the lands, but only to impress them with an easement.
2. It is claimed that the complaint is demurrable because it does not appear therefrom that the parties have disagreed as to the value of the property sought tó be condemned for the public use. But the fact of disagreement is averred in terms. The complaint also alleges that the two corporations could not agree as to the points or manner of crossing,«intersection, and connection.
3. The complaint does contain a statement of all owners and. claimants of the property as required by the statute.
4. Appellants claim that the complaint does not show the location, general route, and termini of the proposed road as required by section 1244 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The “general route” is given and the termini are stated to be National City and “ a connection with the Atlantic and Pacific Eailroad Company at or near the thirty-fifth parallel of north latitude in the State of California.” In Callender v. Painsville Co. 11 Ohio St. 516, it was held that a statement of the termini and line of a road in a certificate of incorporation is sufficient if such as would have been sufficient in a special act of incorporation. An allegation in the complaint as to termini is sufficient if it follow the language contained in a valid certificate of incorporation.
More from California Supreme Court
- People v. Wende (1979)
- People v. Watson (1956)
- People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
- People v. Kelly (2006)
- Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
- People v. Lewis (2021)
- In Re Estrada (1965)
- Denham v. Superior Court (1970)
- People v. Marsden (1970)