People ex rel. Love v. Center

California Supreme Court Apr 3, 1885 No. No. 7,087Published

Before: McKinstry, Thortnon

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that the state retained legal title to the lands because the defendants failed to perform the condition precedent of land reclamation required by the legislative acts, rendering the purported patent void and the defendants' claims invalid.

Issues

Whether the state's action to quiet title and annul a patent was barred by the statute of limitations.
Whether the defendants acquired equitable rights to the land despite failing to perform the statutory condition precedent of reclamation.
Whether the governor and surveyor general had authority to issue a patent without the required certification of reclamation.
Whether the attorney general had authority to initiate the action on behalf of the state.

Disposition. Appeal from judgment dismissed; order denying new trial affirmed.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“As a pretended conveyance the patent is void, because there was no law which authorized the governor to sign, seal, or issue it.”

“The grant never took effect, because the condition precedent was never performed.”

“The state has never parted with the legal title.”

Synopsis

Action to Quiet Title—Plaintiff out of Possession—Nature of Belief.— Section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes an action to quiet title to he maintained hy a plaintiff out of possession. The defendant in such action may assert a legal estate, or any equity which he may claim to have enforced; and the judgment, if in favor of the plaintiff, may provide for a restitution of the possession, and decree the claims of the defendant to he invalid.

Swamp Lands—Act of April 10, 1862, Construed—Certificate of Reolamation—Patent—Possession.—In the absence of a certificate by the governor and surveyor general to the reclamation, as required by section 6 of the act of April 10,1862, a patent for swamp and overflowed lands, purporting to he issued under such act, is void, and conveys no title or right of possession as against the state to either the original patentees or their grantees ; and the fact that the patent was signed by the governor, and countersigned by the register of the state land office, is not equivalent to such certificate, although the office of register and surveyor general were held by the same person. Nor can a message addressed by the governor to the Senate and Assembly, in which he says, “ We believe that under the provisions of the act the grantees and their assigns are entitled to, or at least have a strong claim to, the odd-numbered sections,” etc., he construed to he such certificate.

Id. — Performance of Reclamation — Condition Precedent. — Conceding that, if the governor and surveyor general bad made the statutory certificate, it would he conclusive evidence that the condition precedent as to the performance of the reclamation had been complied with, the patentees —the condition precedent not having in fact been performed—should not be permitted to remain in possession without the certificate.

Id.—Presumptions as to Reclamation—Burden of Proof.—At the end of three years after the passage of the statute, no presumption came into ex- • istence that the grantees had done the work required, for the state could not thus he deprived of its rights by a presumption. On the contrary, the burden was, and continued to he, on the grantees, or their assigns, to prove that the work had been done, the doing of which constituted a condition precedent to the acquisition of any rights by them. The presumption, in the absence of evidence, would have been that the work was not done within the three years or at ail.

Id.—Failure to Complete Reclamation—Forfeiture—Part Prformance. —The act of April 10,1862, was a contract by which the state granted certain lands upon condition of work to be performed, the grant to take effect when the work was done; and upon a failure to make performance within the time limited by the statute, a court of equity will not interfere to protect the parties in possession, although they have made valuable improvements on the land.

Opinion — McKinstry

McKinstry, J. The action was treated by the court below as an action “to quiet title,” under section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and may properly be said to be such an action. The absolute ownership of the lands by the plaintiff is averred, and it is alleged that the defendants claim rights under the acts of the legislature, and a certain instrument purporting to be a patent, which are mentioned in the complaint. Besides the prayer for general relief, there is a special prayer that defendants be summoned to answer the premises, and that the court decree to be invalid all claims of defendants under or by virtue of the alleged legislative grant or patent.

Section 254 of the act known as the practice act, reads :

“ An action may be brought by any person in possession, by himself or his tenant, of real property, against any person who claims an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim, estate, or interest.”

Under that section the owner in possession, on knowledge of the assertion of an adverse claim, could require the nature and character of the adverse estate or interest “ to be produced, exposed, and judicially determined.” (Curtis v. Sutter, 15 Cal. 263.) “ There was no difficulty in so conducting a suit, under the statute, as fully to protect the legal rights of the parties, and at the same time to secure the beneficial result afforded by a court of equity in bills of peace—which is repose from further litigation. Indeed, the remedy under the statute was eminently simple, direct and efficacious.” (Ibid.)

Section 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure is like section [556254] of the former act, except that since the adoption of the code the action may be brought by one out of possession. Bow, as formerly, the defendant may assert a legal estate, or any equity which he may claim to have enforced, the difference being that while under the former statute the possession of the plaintiff was evidence, prima facie, that he was seized in fee, now the plaintiff out of possession, as against the defendant in possession, must prove in himself a legal paramount title which entitles him to the possession. The plaintiff—assuming the state to be entitled to the possession—might have brought an action at law for the recovery of the lands. Under the code, one having the legal title is not required to bring his action at law, and then, after recovery of the possession, to file a bill to quiet his title or possession against equitable claims asserted by the defendant in the ejectment, and to have such claims decreed to be invalid, but may secure both ends in one proceeding. It may be the original defendants herein would have been entitled to demand a jury to try the legal issue as to the right of possession, but a jury was expressly waived. The plaintiff has asked, in effect, that the adverse claims of the defendants be jjroduced, exposed, and adjudicated. The people, when they had established their legal title and right of possession, were to be treated as if they were in possession when the complaint was filed. In their answer the defendants, appealing, allege facts, which, with the evidence to support the allegations, they contend show that they have acquired the legal title of the state by virtue of a compliance, on the part of their predecessors, with the conditions of certain acts of the legislature, to wit: an act “to provide for the construction of canals,” etc., approved April 11, 1857; an act amendatory of the last-named act, approved April 10, 1862, and an act “ in relation to the construction of canals,” etc., approved April 25,1868. (Stats. 1857, 192; Stats. 1862, 190; Stats. 1863, 494.) Of these, further reference need be made only to the act of 1862.

People ex rel. Love v. Center

AI Brief

Synopsis

Opinion — McKinstry

More from California Supreme Court

Related research

Concurrence — Thortnon

AI Brief